



CATCH RULE 22: WHEN INTERPLEADER ACTIONS 
VIOLATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS 
KRISTEN DEWILDE† 
Since the time of the Founding, actions in strict interpleader have allowed parties 
in possession of a fund or other asset to sue claimants who have competing claims to 
that asset. The party in possession of the asset or stake, also referred to as the 
“stakeholder,” has no ownership interest itself. Instead, it seeks only to hand off the 
stake to the rightful party and avoid any future liability. 
Today, interpleader actions can be brought in federal courts in one of two ways. 
They can be brought under Congress’s Federal Interpleader Act, which confers 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear interpleader actions in which at least one 
claimant is diverse from another adverse claimant and $500 is at stake. Alternatively, 
interpleader actions can be brought pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Because the Rules do not on their own confer jurisdiction on the federal 
courts, any action brought under Rule 22 must be brought under one of Congress’s 
general jurisdictional statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires a federal 
question in the lawsuit, or 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which requires in one instance a 
controversy between citizens from different states. Although the Federal Interpleader 
Act requires diversity between adverse claimants, many federal courts exercise 
jurisdiction over strict interpleader actions pursuant to Rule 22 and § 1332 merely 
when the stakeholder is completely diverse from the claimants. 
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University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. & B.B.A, 2017, University of North Texas. On the first 
day of law school, Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff told my civil procedure class that he hoped we 
would, and encouraged us all, to fall in love with the law over the course of our next three-year 
intensive journey. I am forever grateful for his words, advice, and the role he has played in ensuring 
that I did, indeed, fall in love with the law. Additional thanks go to the editors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, especially Molly Wolfe and Lavi M. Ben Dor for their contributions 
throughout the editing process. 
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This Comment argues that anytime an interpleader action is brought in a federal 
court pursuant to Rule 22 and § 1332, there must be diversity between adverse 
claimants—not just diversity between the stakeholder and the claimants—in order to 
satisfy Congress’s and the Constitution’s controversy and diversity requirements. When 
the stakeholder hands off an asset or fund, it admits that the stake belongs to someone 
else—it just is not quite sure which claimant should have the stake. The only 
controversy, then, is the dispute between the claimants over who is the rightful receiver. 
The Supreme Court appeared to confirm in the mid-twentieth century that the existing 
controversy in strict interpleader actions is the one between claimants, not the one 
between the stakeholder and the claimants. Further, Congress’s diversity jurisdiction 
statute and, arguably, the Constitution’s Diversity Clause require courts to realign 
parties to a lawsuit and determine their jurisdiction based on which parties the “actual” 
controversy is between. Finally, in addition to Supreme Court precedent and the 
realignment doctrine, this Comment argues that, based on the text and history of 
Article III’s Diversity Clause, the Constitution requires that claimants be diverse 
before federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over strict interpleader actions. The 
solution to this problem is simple: these actions can be brought and heard in state courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Richard and Mary Smith’s divorce suit was pending for only three months 
when Mr. Smith unexpectedly died.1 In the three months between Mr. 
Smith’s Montgomery County divorce filing and his death, he changed the 
designated beneficiary of his State Farm life insurance policy from Ms. Smith 
to a man named Alejandro Plascencia.2 This new life insurance designation, 
which occurred unbeknownst to Ms. Smith, violated a Montgomery County, 
Texas Standing Order which prohibits parties in a divorce proceeding from 
changing the beneficiary on a life insurance policy.3 After Mr. Smith’s death, 
both Ms. Smith and Mr. Plascencia submitted claims to the life insurance 
proceeds totaling $120,000.4 
When State Farm, an Illinois corporation, could not decide to whom the 
$120,000 belonged, it filed a Rule 22 interpleader action in the Southern 
District of Texas against Ms. Smith and Mr. Plascencia, both Texas citizens.5 
Rule 22 interpleader actions allow parties, like State Farm, who are holders 
of some stake of money or property to go to court, admit that the stake 
belongs to someone, and “interplead” all competing claimants. The stakeholder 
can then deposit the stake with the court, be dismissed from the lawsuit, and 
allow competing claimants like Ms. Smith and Mr. Plascencia to battle it out 
in court who the proper claimant to the stake at issue is.6 
As is typical in any interpleader action, the Southern District of Texas 
issued an order that so long as State Farm deposited the insurance proceeds 
with the registry of the court, it would be discharged from the lawsuit.7 With 
State Farm gone, the federal district court was left to decide whether Texas 
law gave effect to a Texas county standing order that was violated during 
Texas divorce proceedings and, if so, whether insurance proceeds should be 
 
1 Original Complaint in Interpleader ¶¶ 3.2, 3.4, State Farm Ins. Co. v. Smith, No. 17-2950 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017). Smith admitted to both of these allegations. See First Amended Answer 
and Cross-Claim by Defendant Mary Louise Coley Smith ¶¶ 8, 10, Smith, No. 17-2950 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 12, 2018). 
2 See Original Complaint in Interpleader, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3.2-3.3. Smith admitted to these 
allegations. See First Amended Answer, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8, 9. 
3 See Montgomery County First Amended Standing Order Regarding Children, Pets, Property 
and Conduct of the Parties ¶ 6.2 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.mctx.org/document_center/
Courts/Standing%20Order%20-%20TRO%20StandingOrderpetschildprop.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP8
N-MABD]. 
4 Original Complaint in Interpleader, supra note 1, ¶ 3.5. 
5 Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.8. Smith and Plascencia admitted to being Texas citizens. First Amended 
Answer, supra note 1, ¶2; Original Answer by Defendant Alejandro Plascencia ¶ 3, Smith, No. 17-
2950 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2018). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
7 Smith, No. 17-2950, slip. op. at 1-2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2018) (order to deposit interpleader 
fund into registry of the court and dismiss with prejudice). 
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given to one Texas resident over the other. But if all roads lead to Texas, how 
did this case end up in federal court? 
Although many civil procedure topics leave learned scholars grasping for 
clarity, this is not one of them. There is unanimous consensus that if a federal 
court hears a case between citizens of the same state presenting only questions 
arising out of state law, something has gone astray. As Part I of this Comment 
discusses, Article III of the Constitution extends federal judicial power to hear 
cases arising out of federal law. Alternatively, if no federal question exists, Article 
III also grants power to federal courts to hear controversies between diverse 
parties, in particular, “[c]ontroversies . . . between Citizens of different States,” 
as expressed in a provision known as the Diversity Clause.8 Historical analyses 
posit that the Diversity Clause was intended to avoid potential state bias that 
may arise from a lawsuit being litigated in one citizen’s state courts over the 
other’s. Further, the Diversity Clause may have been intended to provide federal 
court jurisdiction when states themselves could not resolve disputes implicating 
issues of “national harmony.” Part I also discusses Congress’s similar concerns 
when it passed its first diversity statute granting federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear suits between citizens from different states. 
Taking this to its logical conclusion, if Texas-based Ms. Smith is left to 
argue with Texas-based Mr. Plascencia about who is entitled to insurance 
policy proceeds under Texas state law, the federal judicial power has not been 
triggered by federal law. Nor can there be any fear that a Texas state judge 
would be biased against one Texas citizen over another Texas citizen—the 
only adverse parties in the lawsuit. Further, a state-law claim to insurance 
proceeds arising from a dispute between citizens of the same state appears to 
present an issue sitting squarely within the competence of state courts. It 
seems, then, that someone took a wrong turn into federal court. 
This is not to say that parties like State Farm should not get to bring their 
interpleader actions somewhere. As Part I continues, interpleader has always 
been a needed, equitable solution to ensure justice and prevent competing 
claimants from dragging a stakeholder into multiple trials. However, 
interpleader was never intended to overstep the bounds of the federal judicial 
power under the U.S. Constitution. Congress had these concerns in mind when 
it passed the 1917 Federal Interpleader Act to provide a statutory vehicle for 
bringing interpleader actions in federal court. It required that all interpleader 
actions have at least one claimant be diverse from another claimant. But when 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect in 1938, lawyers began 
bringing actions under Rule 22 interpleader, not the Federal Interpleader Act. 
As is typical of the federal rules, Rule 22 did not speak to jurisdictional 
requirements such as the requirement that there be a federal question or that 
 
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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the “controversy” in the lawsuit be between diverse citizens. Because of this, 
lower federal courts held that Rule 22 interpleader actions had to meet the 
requirements of Congress’s general statutes granting federal courts jurisdiction 
over cases arising under federal law or in which complete diversity existed 
between the parties to a controversy—codified as 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1332 
today. And gradually, a phenomenon occurred among the lower federal courts 
in which most judges began to accept, without discussion, that as long as the 
stakeholder initiating the lawsuit was diverse from all the state claimants on the 
other side, Congress’s statutory and the Constitution’s “controversy” 
requirements between citizens from different states were met—regardless of 
whether the claimants themselves were diverse from each other. 
As Part II of this Comment argues, when no federal question is at issue, 
the statutory and constitutional requirement that a “controversy” exist 
between diverse parties should be interpreted to require that some issue exists 
in which diverse parties stand in opposition. And when an insurance company 
or any other stakeholder admits its liability to someone, it has no controversy 
with competing claimants—it simply seeks a solution in equity to be 
dismissed from a lawsuit, having no concern for the ultimate outcome. Thus, 
this Comment posits that in order for strict interpleader actions to satisfy the 
statutorily- and constitutionally-based jurisdiction requirements, at least one 
claimant must be diverse from the other when no federal question is at issue 
and no other congressional grant of jurisdiction applies. 
Although interpleader is a procedural device meant to prevent an 
innocent party from the injustice of experiencing multiple lawsuits, federal 
courts are not the only place where justice is available. Part III of this 
Comment explores the implications for federal courts that decide to dismiss 
cases with nondiverse claimants and no federal question like the one involving 
Mr. Plascencia and Ms. Smith. In particular, Part III takes note of the 
interpleader tools available in state courts and the various situations to which 
this Comment’s thesis would extend. 
I. HISTORY OF THE ARTICLE III DIVERSITY CLAUSE, STATUTORY 
INTERPLEADER, AND RULE 22 INTERPLEADER ACTIONS 
Today, insurance companies and other stakeholders frequently sue 
competing claimants for the proceeds of an insurance policy or other fund of 
money using some form of interpleader. It has become standard practice for 
these stakeholders to admit liability and leave the lawsuit behind using Rule 
22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It has also become standard 
practice for the federal courts to move the litigation forward in their courts, 
without questioning their jurisdiction, so long as the stakeholder is diverse 
from the claimants. But how did federal courts get to this point of routinely 
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hearing cases that they have no judicial power to hear? This Part examines 
the history of Article III’s diversity jurisdiction requirement and Congress’s 
similar statutory grant of jurisdiction. It explains the suggested purposes for 
the Constitution’s Diversity Clause and touches on the history of Congress’s 
statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction under the Clause. 
This Part then traces the development of interpleader actions against the 
backdrop of the Diversity Clause. Although interpleader actions were available 
in federal courts from the judiciary’s establishment to the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, diversity requirements for interpleader 
actions were rarely, if ever, discussed. In fact, many interpleader actions were 
brought in state courts.9 Congress had no need to act in the interpleader arena 
until it realized that personal jurisdiction requirements were keeping 
interpleader actions with claimants from different states out of federal and state 
courts. Congress decided to remedy any potential double vexation in these 
situations by passing the Federal Interpleader Act in 1917. Then, when the 
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure decided to accept 
a drafted interpleader rule in 1937, they explicitly debated the need for a rule 
that seemed duplicative of Congress’s interpleader statute. The Committee did 
not intend to create a rule that would allow interpleader actions to get into 
federal courts with nondiverse, adverse claimants—beyond what Congress’s 
interpleader statute permitted. Rather, they decided it would be convenient for 
lawyers to have the rule for interpleader actions stated amongst the other 
joinder rules. These blips in history reveal that scholars and Congress in the 
early twentieth century believed that to stay within Article III’s bounds, 
interpleader actions filed in federal courts required diversity between adverse 
claimants, not diversity between the stakeholder and the claimants. 
A. History of Diversity Jurisdiction Under Article III of the Constitution 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the 
federal “judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens 
of different States . . . .”10 There is limited historical insight available as to what 
 
9 A simple Westlaw search will reveal that between 1789 and 1917, close to 5000 state cases 
concerned interpleader in some way, compared to 302 federal cases. Similarly, Lexis Advance reveals 
4381 state cases and 300 federal cases. 
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It is widely understood and accepted that Congress cannot 
extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond what the Constitution provides. See James E. 
Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 
1936-37 (2004) (explaining that despite the outcome of Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), which extended the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to reach disputes between a citizen of a state and a citizen of the District of Columbia, 
a majority of Justices in that case voted in favor of the principle that jurisdiction cannot be expanded 
by Congress beyond the scope of Article III). 
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the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution were thinking when they 
respectively wrote, and adopted, the clause granting federal courts power to hear 
cases between diverse citizens, even when no federal law question is at issue. 
Despite the limited historical record, Judge Friendly, after conducting a 
thorough historical analysis, revealed several intentions and reservations that 
surrounded the Diversity Clause.11 For instance, one intent was “to preserve 
the harmony of states and that of the citizens thereof.”12 However, the 
Framers of the Constitution were mostly interested in limiting federal judicial 
power over such actions rather than enlarging it. James Madison described 
the “cognizance of disputes between citizens of different states” as a matter 
of little importance.13 Other Diversity Clause opponents worried that “the 
state courts would be absorbed by those of the Federal Government.”14 Some 
were concerned about the burden of costs and travel that would be placed on 
a person sued miles away from where they live.15 
Despite opposition, the Diversity Clause was ratified, and since then the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the Diversity Clause’s existence as a way to 
meet the Constitution’s apprehension towards the states’ ability to be impartial 
when administering justice between citizens of different states.16 Judge Friendly 
also revealed that although the Supreme Court has traditionally described the 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction as preventing bias in state courts against out-
of-state citizens, the supporters of the Clause at the time of ratification were 
more worried about state legislatures.17 Namely, they were worried about cases 
in which an out-of-state citizen would have to bring their property into a state 
and thus subject the property to the laws of that state.18 Whether supporters 
feared state bias through their laws or their courts, Judge Friendly explained that 
the Diversity Clause’s ratification was ultimately made possible, despite its large 
body of opponents, because “there had been frequent assurances that Congress 
 
11 See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
483 (1928). 
12 Id. at 485-86 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 238 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Yates’s Notes, June 13, 1787) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION]). 
13 Id. at 487 (citation omitted). 
14 Id. at 489. 
15 Id. at 491. 
16 Id. at 492 (citing Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (U.S. 1809)); see also, 
e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 553-54 (2005) (“The complete diversity 
requirement is not mandated . . . . The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the complete diversity rule 
in light of the purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important 
disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.”); Guar. Tr. 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident 
litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.”). 
17 Friendly, supra note 11, at 495. 
18 Id. 
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would prevent the dire consequences which the Anti-Federalists had seen arising 
from the judiciary clause.”19 The Framers believed that “[t]he Supreme Court 
could hardly interpret the section in such a way as to render all these promises 
nugatory,” because “[t]here was no reason for taking over business which the 
state courts could handle without serious prejudice to any national interest.”20 
One scholar, Professor Cross, has recently argued that Article III’s 
Diversity Clause cannot purely be understood by the “stock rationale” that 
the Framers wanted to prevent local bias.21 As Professor Cross notes, the 
Constitutional Convention approved and sent to the Committee of Detail a 
drafted Diversity Clause that extended federal court jurisdiction over 
controversies that “involve the National peace and harmony.”22 And when 
Edmond Randolph was left to draft the details of this “principle,” he was 
guided by the idea that the Convention wanted “to preserve the harmony of 
states and that of the citizens thereof.”23 After a thorough historical analysis, 
Professor Cross concludes that the term “harmony” at the time of the 
Founding “emerge[d] from a conceptual effort by the Founders to identify 
matters that would produce entanglements of interests that would spill across 
state lines.”24 Professor Cross concludes that in addition to the traditionally-
asserted purpose of preventing state bias, the Diversity Clause was also 
“broadly designed to prevent state boundaries from impeding judicial efforts 
to dispose of controversies in the most fair and efficient manner possible.”25 
Professor Cross emphasizes that a “national harmony” understanding of the 
Diversity Clause reveals that the clause was not just meant to prevent state 
bias, but rather, it was intended to reach situations involving interstate 
matters that no single state government could meet on its own due to 
territorial constraints.26 
 
19 Id. at 508. 
20 Id. 
21 Jesse M. Cross, National “Harmony”: An Inter-Branch Constitutional Principle and Its 
Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 93 NEV. L. REV. 139, 148 (2014) (quoting Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 
The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdiction Reform, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1823, 1847 (2008)). 
22 Id. at 155 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 39 
(Journal, July 18, 1787)). 
23 Id. at 157 (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 238 
(Yates’s Notes, June 13, 1787)). Professor Cross also notes that Madison and Hamilton referred to 
“harmony” of the states when describing the Constitution’s Diversity Clause in The Federalist Papers. 
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 235 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 445-46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)). 
24 Id. at 169. 
25 Id. at 186. 
26 Id. 
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B. History of Statutory Diversity Jurisdiction 
Using the Constitution as an outline for the reach of the federal judicial 
power, Congress has passed statutes since 1789 conferring jurisdiction to 
federal courts within the Constitution’s bounds.27 
Soon after the Constitution’s ratification, the First Congress worked to 
pass an act establishing a federal judiciary and defining its jurisdiction. Similar 
to the objections coming from the ratifiers of the Constitution, several 
congressional members voiced dissent over the need for the establishment of 
a federal judiciary and the extent of its concurrent power with the states. One 
member, Thomas Tudor Tucker, wanted to strike the entirety of an act that 
would establish “inferior Federal courts” because he thought that “the State 
Courts were fully competent to the purposes for which these courts were to 
be created, and they would be a burthensome and useless expense.”28 Another 
member, Samuel Livermore, also argued against establishing federal courts, 
stating that “[t]here is already in each State a system of jurisprudence . . . .”29 
Despite concerns, the First Judiciary Act was passed by both houses in 
1789.30 It provided in part that the “circuit courts shall have original 
cognizance . . . of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where 
the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs,” $500, and “the suit is 
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of 
another state.”31 
Congress has always retained some form of its statute granting diversity 
jurisdiction to the lower federal courts; however, the statute has not gone 
without modification. In 1875, Congress amended the statute to grant 
jurisdiction to the circuit courts to hear suits where the “matter in dispute” 
exceeded $500 and “in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of 
different States . . . .”32 This amendment not only used the word “controversy” 
instead of “suit,” but it also allowed for actions to be brought in federal courts 
by citizens of two (diverse) non-forum states.33 
 
27 See Honorable Diane P. Wood, The Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 593, 594-95 (2009) (explaining that it has been understood that Congress can restrict the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to less than what the Constitution would permit). 
28 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 813 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
29 Id. 
30 First Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. 
31 Id. at 78. 
32 Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. 
33 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1420 (7th ed. 2015) (explaining that from 1789 to 1875, diversity 
jurisdiction only extended to cases between citizens of the forum state and a citizen of another state 
under Congress’s diversity statute). The word “controversy” first appeared in the diversity statute 
in 1867; Congress did seem to have intended a difference in word choice, but not in meaning, when 
it introduced the term. See 2 CONG. REC. 4303 (1874). 
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The current diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, resembles the 1875 
amendments to the diversity statute. It now requires that the “matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs” and be between “citizens of different states.”34 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress’s general diversity 
jurisdiction statute requires what has come to be known as “complete 
diversity,” meaning that all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.35 
The Supreme Court has clarified that although Congress can require by 
statute complete diversity between adverse parties, the Constitution only 
requires minimal diversity, in which it is sufficient to have only one adverse 
party diverse from the other.36 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted 
Congress’s general diversity jurisdiction statute as a narrower grant of 
jurisdiction than what the Constitution permits, Congress has exercised its 
ability to grant jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution 
in certain contexts—namely, in cases of interpleader.37 
C. History of Interpleader Actions Before Statutory and Rule Interpleader 
Interpleader has long been a part of American jurisprudence, and its form 
has remained more or less the same for the past 200 years. Interpleader 
developed to address situations in which two or more persons had competing 
claims to some stake of money, property, or other interest, and the person 
who was obligated to give that stake away did not know which claimant was 
the proper one.38 Despite not knowing which claimant was the rightful owner 
of the stake, the stakeholder admitted liability and was “wholly indifferent” 
as to who actually received the stake.39 Because interpleader bills were created 
 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018). 
35 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“In [Strawbridge], this Court held that the diversity of 
citizenship statute required ‘complete diversity’ . . . .”). 
36 Id. at 530-31. 
37 Wood, supra note 27, at 595 (“For a long time, with the exception of statutory interpleader, 
Congress made almost no use of its broader constitutional power to open the doors of the federal 
courts to suits involving the more expansive notion of minimal diversity.” (footnote omitted)). 
38 CHARLES EDWARDS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON PARTIES TO BILLS AND OTHER 
PLEADINGS IN CHANCERY: WITH PRECEDENTS 71 (1832); see also WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 118-19 (William A. 
Herrick ed., 1871) (1867) (explaining that interpleader actions are brought when “there is a conflict 
between two or more persons severally claiming the same debt, duty, or obligation by different or 
separate interests, and [when] the person who is liable to discharge the debt, duty, or obligation does 
not know which of the claimants is in fact entitled,” and the person liable is “threatened with double 
vexation by having two or more processes going on against him at the same time in respect of a 
subject-matter in which he claims no interest, and in relation to which he has not incurred any 
independent liability to either of the claimants”). 
39 EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 71. 
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as a device solely to remedy the situation in which a stakeholder was 
threatened with two lawsuits by competing claimants40—also known as 
“double vexation”—interpleader originated in equity.41 Interpleader allowed 
for competing claimants to be pitted against each other to “settle the contest 
between themselves, without involving the [stakeholder] in a dispute in which 
he is not interested . . . .”42 The wisdom of the interpleader device is 
unquestioned because it prevents two or more trials from proceeding against 
one person for the same stake and instead allows for one proceeding to 
encompass multiple claimants at the same time.43 
Although interpleader actions today are brought under statutes or rules 
of procedure in state and federal courts, interpleader originated in equity 
and was later recognized by common law courts due to the legal claims at 
issue.44 And while modern interpleader routinely concerns cases where there 
are rival claimants to insurance proceeds,45 interpleader is not limited to the 
insurance context. Nineteenth-century American interpleader actions were 
brought for many commercial transactions.46 In Renaissance England, when 
bailees held chattels as security for the performance of one bailor’s promise 
to another, interpleader allowed the bailee to sue when he was “in doubt 
 
40 4 WILLIAM WAIT, A TREATISE UPON SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW, WHETHER OF A LEGAL, OR OF AN EQUITABLE NATURE: INCLUDING THEIR RELATIONS 
AND APPLICATION TO ACTIONS AND DEFENSES IN GENERAL, WHETHER IN COURTS OF 
COMMON LAW, OR COURTS OF EQUITY AND EQUALLY ADAPTED TO COURTS GOVERNED BY 
CODES 150 (1879) (“The proper remedy, therefore, of a person sued, or who is in danger of being 
sued, by several claimants of the same property, is to file a bill to compel them, by the authority of 
a court of equity, to interplead, either at law or in equity.”). 
41 KERR, supra note 38, at 118-20. 
42 Id. at 119; accord Wells, Fargo, & Co. v. Miner, 25 F. 533, 533 (D. Cal. 1885) (“This is an 
application for a preliminary injunction, in a suit on the equity side of the court . . . to compel 
[claimants] to interplead with one another respecting a certain certificate of deposit . . . .”); La. State 
Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 F. 20, 21 (E.D. La. 1883) (“When . . . another person, not knowing to which 
of the claimants he ought of right to render a debt or duty, or to deliver property in his custody, 
fears that he may be hurt by some of them, he may exhibit a bill of interpleader against them.” 
(citation omitted)); City Bank of N.Y. v. Skelton, 5 F. Cas. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1846) (“I should feel 
no difficulty in declaring, upon the general principles of equity jurisprudence, that a bank may be 
entitled to relief by bill of interpleader against separate and adversary parties who claim title to 
moneys therein deposited.”). 
43 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814, 815, 818 (1921) (“The 
fundamental purpose of interpleader is simple and just. The applicant has incurred one obligation, 
but is subjected to two or more claims. If one claim is right, the rest must be wrong. An efficient 
and fair-minded system of justice ought not to subject a citizen to double vexation . . . .”). 
44 WAIT, supra note 40, at 149 (describing how interpleader was used at common law in cases 
where a person had come into accidental possession of another’s chattel and in which the chattel’s 
owner was contested or in cases of joint bailment). 
45 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Myron Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of 
Interpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706, 706-07 (1964) (“Today, the standard case of interpleader is the 
insurance company confronted by rival claimants to the proceeds of a life insurance policy.”). 
46 Id. at 706. 
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whether the promise had been performed, and therefore in doubt as to whom 
to make redelivery.”47 
Interpleader has traditionally been viewed as involving two stages: “The 
first stage relieves the [stakeholder] from double vexation and liability in a 
dispute foreign to him; in the second stage, the controversy is settled by the 
[claimants] directly concerned.”48 In the first stage, the “most essential fact to 
be established . . . is that [the stakeholder] claims no interest in or to the 
property or thing in dispute.”49 After the stakeholder establishes that he has 
“money in his hands which is claimed by two or more persons,” that he is 
“indifferent” between those claimants, and that he has “incurred no 
independent liability,” the stakeholder deposits the stake with the court.50 The 
court in the second stage then discharges the stakeholder from the lawsuit 
while the claimants continue to litigate over the proper owner of the stake.51 
This pure, “strict” form of interpleader, in which there is a disinterested 
stakeholder, should be distinguished from another kind of interpleader known 
as “nature of interpleader.”52 In strict bills of interpleader, the stakeholder has 
no claim against either claimant and seeks nothing more than to leave the 
stake with the court and be discharged from the lawsuit.53 Likewise, neither 
claimant seeks anything more from the stakeholder.54 In contrast, bills in 
“nature of interpleader” (to which this Comment’s thesis does not apply) 
occur when the stakeholder also has some interest in, or claim to, the fund.55 
Courts in equity traditionally only recognized strict interpleader,56 but, as 
discussed next, statutory and rule interpleader would eventually come to 
cover both types. 
 
47 Id. 
48 Chafee, supra note 43, at 816. 
49 WAIT, supra note 40, at 151. 
50 Hayward & Clark v. McDonald, 192 F. 890, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1912). 
51 Id. 
52 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.02 (Matthew Bender 
ed., 3d ed. 2019). 
53 Hayward & Clark, 192 F. at 892-93. 
54 Id.; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134, 
1136 (1932) (“[W]hen interpleader is granted, the decrees discharging the stakeholder and ordering 
the claimants to interplead with respect to the deposit in court also enjoins the claimants from 
bringing or pressing any suits against the stakeholder.”). 
55 Sherman Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 238 F. 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); see 
also Chafee, supra note 54, at 1138 (“Bills in the nature of interpleader lie when the applicant shows 
that in addition to multiple vexation he has some other reason for coming into equity, for instance, 
the administration of a trust, the enforcement of a lien, or cancellation of an instrument.”). 
56 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 22.02; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 506 (W.H. Lyon ed., 
14th ed. 1918) (“[I]f the party himself seeking the aid of the court by bill of interpleader claims an 
interest in the subject-matter as well as the other parties, there is no foundation for the exercise of 
the jurisdiction; for in such a case he has other appropriate remedies.”). 
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D. History of Statutory Interpleader Actions Under Federal Law 
Although interpleader actions were brought in federal courts throughout the 
nineteenth century, limitations on personal jurisdiction often prevented federal 
and state courts from hearing cases in which the claimants were from different 
states.57 In response, Congress passed its first interpleader statute in 1917.58 
This Federal Interpleader Act granted U.S. district courts jurisdiction 
over interpleader suits filed in equity by insurance companies or fraternal 
beneficiary societies when: (1) one or more of the claimants resided within 
the jurisdiction of the court in which the action was filed; (2) the insurance 
company or society had issued an insurance policy that provided a sum 
payment of at least $500 to a beneficiary or legal representative; (3) “two or 
more adverse claimants, citizens of different States, [claimed] to be entitled 
to such insurance or benefits”; and (4) the insurance company deposited the 
amount of the policy with the clerk of the court.59 After receiving a deposit 
from the insurance company, the court could discharge the company from the 
lawsuit and any further liability.60 
The legislative history provides some insights into Congress’s reasons for 
passing the bill. The House Report asserts that the “purpose” of the Federal 
Interpleader Act was to solve the situation in which two or more people living 
in different states made competing claims to life insurance proceeds.61 
Because courts in equity did not have power to order personal service on 
defendants residing outside of their territorial jurisdiction, it was formerly 
impossible to bring interpleader actions against claimants living in different 
states.62 When the claimants resided in different jurisdictions, “frequently 
two or more suits [were] brought against the company in different States,” 
resulting in “expensive and troublesome litigation” that “generally 
 
57 See Chafee, supra note 54, at 1167 (explaining that there was little controversy in Congress 
enacting the Federal Interpleader Act and taking cases away from the state courts because it was 
normally impossible to serve out-of-state claimants, preventing litigation of cases involving claimants 
from different states); see also Developments in the Law, Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 874, 914 (1958) (“When claimants to be interpleaded are citizens of different states, 
there may be no one state court which is able to assert in personam jurisdiction over all the claimants 
because of the limitations imposed by the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). 
58 Federal Interpleader Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-346, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929, 929. This was later 
amended with changes that are not pertinent for the scope of this Comment. See Federal Interpleader 
Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 68-465, ch. 317, 43 Stat. 976, 976-77. For a discussion on the differences 
between the Federal Interpleader Acts of 1917 and 1926, see Chafee, supra note 54, at 1163-64. 
59 Federal Interpleader Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-346, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929, 929. 
60 Id. 
61 H.R. REP. NO. 64-677, at 1 (1916). 
62 Id. at 2. This problem occurred because insurance proceeds were not considered “property” 
within the district. Id. However, for stakes that were considered property within the district, service 
could be effected on defendants outside the district. Id. 
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prevent[ed] a fair trial of the issues between the conflicting claimants.”63 The 
Judiciary Committee similarly presented to the Senate that the reason for the 
Act was to “cure [the] evil” that existed when there was no tribunal in which 
the holder of an insurance fund could bring an interpleader action against 
claimants residing in different states.64 
Because the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917 only provided an 
interpleader method for insurance companies and fraternal beneficiary 
societies, federal courts continued to exercise jurisdiction over interpleader 
actions at equity and under the common law that did not involve such 
companies.65 This practice mostly stopped by 1936, when the Federal 
Interpleader Act was repealed and replaced with an amendment to the 
Judiciary Code that provided U.S. district courts with original jurisdiction 
over interpleader actions not exclusive to insurance company stakeholders.66 
The amendment allowed for bills of interpleader or in the nature of 
interpleader to be “filed by any person, firm, corporation, association, or 
society having in his custody or possession money or property of the value of 
$500 . . . or being under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of 
$500 or more . . . .”67 Congress kept the requirement that there be “[t]wo or 
more adverse claimants, citizens of different States . . . .”68 The current 
interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, has essentially the same 
requirements.69 The fact that Congress enacted such a broad statute granting 
jurisdiction to district courts over any bill of interpleader with $500 at stake 
and at least one diverse claimant begs the question: Why was the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure for interpleader actions ever drafted? After all, could it 
really cover anything more? 
 
63 Id. at 1. 
64 S. REP. NO. 64-660, at 2 (1916). 
65 See Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198, 199 (1922) (adjudicating a case between 
competing claimants to a yacht being sold by the Secretary of the Navy); see also Multiparty Litigation 
in the Federal Courts, supra note 57, at 918 (“The Federal Interpleader Act was interpreted as not 
supplanting, but merely supplementing the pre-existing equity jurisdiction in interpleader.”). 
66 Act of Jan. 20, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-422, 49 Stat. 1096, 1096-97 (amending section 24 of the 
Judicial Code). Only a few courts maintained that interpleader actions could be brought when a 
stakeholder was diverse from co-citizen claimants, and because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
did not exist yet, these courts could only justify these actions as interpleader in equity or under the 
common law instead of interpleader under the Federal Interpleader Act. See Sec. Tr. & Sav. Bank 
of San Diego v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1937); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. 
Supp. 967, 971-72 (W.D. Ky. 1936). 
67 49 Stat. at 1096. 
68 Id. 
69 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2018) (requiring that adverse claimants be of diverse citizenship “as 
defined in . . . section 1332 of this title” and that the amount in controversy be at least $500). 
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E. History of Rule Interpleader 
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act.70 Whereas the Federal Interpleader Act and its 
subsequent amendments were meant to supplement interpleader actions in 
equity, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were meant to be “a merger of 
law and equity.”71 Included in the new body of rules was Rule 22, which 
provided a method for interpleader for any lawsuit brought in federal court. 
It currently reads: 
(a) GROUNDS. 
(1) By a Plaintiff. Persons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to 
double or multiple liability may be joined as defendants and required to 
interplead. Joinder for interpleader is proper even though: 
(A) the claims of the several claimants, or the titles on which 
their claims depend, lack a common origin or are adverse and 
independent rather than identical; or 
(B) the plaintiff denies liability in whole or in part to any or 
all of the claimants. 
(2) By a Defendant. A defendant exposed to similar liability may seek 
interpleader through a crossclaim or counterclaim. 
(b) RELATION TO OTHER RULES AND STATUTES. This rule supplements—and 
does not limit—the joinder of parties allowed by Rule 20. The remedy this rule 
provides is in addition to—and does not supersede or limit—the remedy 
provided by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, and 2361. An action under those statutes 
must be conducted under these rules.72 
The Advisory Committee’s 1937 report containing the proposed rule sheds 
little light as to why it included Rule 22 when Congress had already enacted 
the Federal Interpleader Act.73 The report only explained that the rule “allows 
 
70 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2018)); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1028 
(1982) (discussing history of Rules Enabling Act and noting that the Rules became effective in 1938). 
71 Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, supra note 57, at 918. 
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 22. The current rule is substantially the same as the one originally promulgated 
in 1937 and made effective the following year, and only differs from it in minor technical ways such as 
changes in the statutory numbers referenced. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 22.01. 
73 See Donald L. Doernberg, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: Rule Interpleader, the Anti-Injunction 
Act, In Personam Jurisdiction, and M.C. Escher, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 561 n.37 (1996) (asking if “the 
Federal Rules provided a different form of interpleader at all” and suggesting that “[i]t may have been 
to take advantage of a diversity pattern different from that authorized by the statute (i.e., one where 
all of the claimants were from the same state and the stakeholder was diverse from them)”). 
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an action to be brought under the recent interpleader statute when applicable,” 
and that “all remedies under the statute are continued, but the manner of 
obtaining them is in accordance with these rules.”74 Despite the lack of 
explanation provided by the report, the Advisory Committee’s meeting 
minutes do show what the Rule drafters were up to when they entertained and 
then enshrined the idea of a federal rule for interpleader actions. 
When the Advisory Committee first began to review the drafted 
interpleader rule in 1935, the committee members themselves were confused as 
to its purpose and function. One committee member, Warren Olney Jr., a former 
Supreme Court Justice of California, admitted that he “never had any 
interpleader experience in the Federal court, as it happens.”75 He wondered 
whether the right of interpleader in the federal courts was in question insofar as 
a rule would be required for it, suggesting that the statute be left alone and that 
the committee should not deal with a rule.76 In deciding how to properly craft 
the rule, one committee member suggested that the rule should simply state that 
a Texas claimant suing a New York corporation should be able to sue that 
corporation for a stake, and then the New York corporation could bring in other 
claimants to the fund.77 However, immediately upon this suggestion William D. 
Mitchell, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee and former U.S. Solicitor 
and Attorney General, noted that in a “good many cases” that situation could go 
up against the question of “diversity of citizenship.”78 
Another committee member, Yale Law School Dean Charles Edward 
Clark, suggested that even if the rule added little to the Federal Interpleader 
Act, it should be included because an interested lawyer might “try to look to 
find it” in the Rules.79 The committee members then proceeded to have the 
Federal Interpleader Act of 1926 read aloud to them.80 The members ended 
their discussion with a motion that the reporter would draft a rule on 
interpleader and then confirm with a professor the extent to which 
interpleader was not already covered by existing law.81 
When the Advisory Committee met again in 1936 to discuss the rule, 
Congress had just passed the 1936 amendment to the Federal Interpleader 
Act, which expanded interpleader to any association or person, and not just 
 
74 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT CONTAINING PROPOSED 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (1937). 
75 2 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, MEETING MINUTES 518 (Nov. 1, 
1935), https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-civil
-procedure-november-1935-vol [https://perma.cc/L2QE-C6G8]. 
76 Id. at 518-19. 
77 Id. at 521-22. 
78 Id. at 522. 
79 Id. at 523. 
80 Id. at 525. 
81 Id. at 527-28. 
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insurance companies.82 With the passage of the new amendment, the 
Committee remained unsure as to how their rule would differ from the 
statute.83 Again, the Committee emphasized that the reason for the rule was 
“so that lawyers would know where to look for it.”84 But then, Chairman 
Mitchell announced to the group that he had helped draft the 1917 Federal 
Interpleader Act.85 He “remember[ed] putting in that clause about diversity 
of citizenship so as to be sure [he] had a constitutional statute,” referring 
specifically to the requirement that at least one claimant be diverse from the 
other.86 The Chairman explained that he was not aware of “any authority of 
that kind which justifies our dragging in an interpleader statute where no 
question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States is 
involved, in a case where there is a controversy between two persons who are 
not citizens of different states.”87 Responding to the Chairman’s concerns, 
Dean Clark said that the rule would be subject to “existing jurisdiction,” and 
that if the Committee chose to adopt the rule, it would not be affirming or 
rejecting Congress’s requirement that there be diverse claimants—it would 
be leaving the matter to be “worked out.”88 The Chairman stood by his claim: 
I have not studied this; but if your provision or your act provides for 
depositing the money in court, so that there is no controversy as far as the 
deposit is concerned, between the plaintiff and either claimant, your only 
controversy is between the conflicting claimants. The result is that it is not 
necessary, under that kind of bill, to have the plaintiff [be] a citizen of a 
different State than both of the defendants.89 
Coming to the Chairman’s aid was a memorandum prepared by Professor 
Chafee, which stated that “[t]he [diversity] clause [of the Federal Interpleader 
Act] is very important because it describes the necessary diversity of 
citizenship which gives Federal jurisdiction.”90 
 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
83 3 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, MEETING MINUTES 588 (Feb. 
22, 1936), https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-february-1936-vol-0 [https://perma.cc/255A-ZSW4]. 
84 Id. at 591. 
85 Id. at 593. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 593-94. 
88 Id. at 594. 
89 Id. at 597. Chairman Mitchell did believe, however, that if a nature of interpleader action 
was filed in which the plaintiff did contest his own liability, then diversity of citizenship would be 
needed between the plaintiff and at least one of the claimants, which is a belief that is not at odds 
with the thesis of this Comment. Id. He specifically stated that “[t]he moment you . . . allow [a 
plaintiff] to contest his own liability as between himself and the man who is a citizen of the same 
State as himself, you are running squarely afoul of the Federal Constitution.” Id. 
90 Id. at 597-98. 
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These meeting minutes show that when the Advisory Committee decided 
to include a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for interpleader actions: (1) at 
least some of the members did think any action brought under Rule 22 
interpleader would still require diversity between claimants in order to 
comply with the Constitution; (2) the members decided to put these 
jurisdictional concerns to the side because the courts could work out the 
diversity requirements of the rule, which was not meant to confer 
jurisdiction; and (3) that the main purpose of including a rule—that the 
Committee itself struggled to distinguish from the statute—was simply to 
make it easier for lawyers to find it. 
II. NONDIVERSE CLAIMANTS IN STRICT BILLS OF INTERPLEADER 
VIOLATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
Chairman Mitchell of the first Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure worried about a procedural rule’s potential to open federal 
court doors for actions that would not have been allowed under Congress’s 
statutory scheme. Specifically, the Chairman wondered if the creation of Rule 
22 would “run[] afoul of the idea that we are enlarging the jurisdiction as [then] 
defined by law.”91 As anticipated, plaintiff-stakeholders began to bring actions 
in interpleader using Rule 22 that would not satisfy the jurisdiction 
requirements under Congress’s interpleader statute. Courts promptly held that, 
because Rule 22 was not a jurisdiction-conferring rule, any action brought under 
Rule 22 needed to comply with Congress’s jurisdictional statutes.92 These 
included § 1332, requiring a controversy exceeding $75,000 between citizens of 
different states and § 1331, requiring an action involving a question of federal 
law.93 However, it is unclear why so many courts assumed that the requirements 
of § 1332, in addition to those of the Constitution, were met merely because a 
plaintiff-stakeholder was diverse from co-citizen claimants and the amount in 
controversy was proper—especially in light of the fact that this view was not 
supported by scholars of interpleader actions at the time.94 In other words, it is 
 
91 Id. at 596. 
92 E.g., Danville Bldg. Ass’n of Danville, Ill. v. Gates, 66 F. Supp. 706, 709 (E.D. Ill. 1946) (“Nor 
did the [Federal Interpleader] Act abrogate the right to bring suits of interpleader under general 
provisions of [an earlier version of § 1331], which confers general jurisdiction over actions based on 
diversity or a federal question.”); Harris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (“Rule 
22(1) adopts the jurisdictional rule for ordinary actions . . . . Thus, altho [sic] under the Interpleader Act 
there must be diversity between the claimants, such is not required under . . . Rule 22.”). 
93 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(1) (2018). 
94 See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 54, at 1168 (stating that “[i]f there are only two claimants, it is 
certain that their co-citizenship would be a bar to relief ”). 
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not clear why courts assumed that a “controversy” existed between a stakeholder 
and claimants in strict interpleader actions. 
Today, federal courts adjudicate interpleader actions between claimants of 
the same state almost biweekly.95 But as this Part presents, when a disinterested 
stakeholder brings claimants into a federal court to battle out the ownership of 
a certain stake, the claimants are set up as adverse parties to each other, not to 
the stakeholder. When no federal issue exists and federal courts instead rely on 
state-based party diversity for their subject-matter jurisdiction, diversity 
between the claimants must be required in order to prevent an exercise of 
jurisdiction beyond Congress’s statutory grant and the Constitution. 
As this Part presents, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the 
meaning of “controversy” in the context of congressional statutory grants of 
jurisdiction to require disputes between parties with colliding interests. 
Because claimants in strict interpleader actions have colliding interests but 
the stakeholder and claimants do not, any Rule 22 interpleader action brought 
under § 1332 goes beyond Congress’s grant of statutory jurisdiction if it does 
not include diverse claimants. 
This Part also proposes that any exercise of jurisdiction over nondiverse 
claimants when no federal question exists violates Article III’s Diversity 
Clause in addition to § 1332. This Part reaches this conclusion by first 
interpreting what Article III’s “controversy” requirement entails based on its 
history and text. Next, it argues that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“controversy” in the context of congressional statutory grants of jurisdiction 
should also be understood as one grounded in the Constitution. Finally, this 
Part discusses how two Supreme Court opinions in the mid-twentieth century 
already appear to offer an interpretation of what kinds of interpleader actions 
may be heard in federal court within the bounds of the Constitution. Both of 
 
95 At the time of this writing, multiple interpleader cases involving nondiverse claimants have 
been litigated in federal courts in just the last three months. For examples, see Principal Life Ins. 
Co. v. Noble, No. 18-4576, 2019 WL 1651750, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2019) (Iowa plaintiff-stakeholder 
and Illinois defendant-claimants); Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Frantz, 371 F. Supp. 3d 960, 963 n.1 (D. 
Kan. 2019) (Tennessee and Georgia plaintiff-stakeholder and Kansas defendant-claimants); In re 
$323,647.60 in Funds Belonging to Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe, No. 18-01194, 2019 WL 687832, at *4 
(D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2019) (plaintiff-stakeholder diverse from all California claimant-defendants); 
Transamerica Life Ins. Company’s Complaint-in-Interpleader at 1, Rabadi v. Lysaght Law Group 
LLP, 753 F. App’x 463 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2019) (No. 17-55570) (Iowa plaintiff-stakeholder and 
California defendant-claimants); Complaint for Interpleader at 1, United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. 
Seay, 2019 WL 1338406 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2019) (No. 1-00010) (Nebraska stakeholder and Georgia 
claimants); Complaint for Interpleader at 1, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 2019 WL 917430 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 25, 2019) (No. 18-81402) (New York plaintiff-stakeholder and Florida defendant-claimants); 
Complaint in Interpleader at 1, Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Humphreys, 2019 WL 486317 (D. 
New. Mex. Feb. 7, 2019) (No. 17-979) (Oklahoma plaintiff-stakeholder and New Mexico defendant-
claimants); Complaint in Interpleader at 1, Hailey v. Waller, 363 F. Supp. 3d 605 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 
2019) (No. 18-00436) (New York plaintiff-stakeholder and Maryland defendant-claimants). 
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these cases seemed to hold that diversity must exist between adverse claimants 
to meet Congress’s and the Constitution’s controversy requirement. 
A. The Controversy Required by Congress’s Diversity Jurisdiction Statute 
Since 1789, Congress has granted jurisdiction to the lower federal courts 
over “suits,”—later described as “controversies”—between citizens of 
different states so long as a specified amount in dispute is met.96 With over 
200 years of building precedent, the Supreme Court has spoken a multitude 
of times as to the meaning of “controversy” under Congress’s diversity 
statute. As described below, the Supreme Court has consistently held that in 
order to satisfy the “controversy” requirement under statutory diversity 
jurisdiction, courts must ascertain which parties the “real” dispute exists 
between—looking beyond who is merely deemed the “plaintiff” or the 
“defendant.” This Comment argues that under this long-established 
interpretation of Congress’s diversity jurisdiction statute, strict interpleader 
actions where no federal question arises requires diversity between competing 
claimants—the parties to which a real “controversy” is between—when the 
interpleader action is brought under Rule 22 and § 1332 instead of Congress’s 
interpleader statute. 
As early as Strawbridge v. Curtiss,97 the Supreme Court placed an emphasis 
on looking at distinct and joint interests when deciding if a controversy 
existed between citizens from different states. The Court interpreted the 
early diversity jurisdiction statute as meaning 
that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are 
entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts. That is, that where the 
interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be 
competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts.98 
The Court built upon the need to look at the “interests” of the parties 
involved when it began interpreting Congress’s 1875 diversity statute—which 
granted jurisdiction to federal courts and allowed for removal when “a 
controversy between citizens of different States,” existed with a matter in 
dispute exceeding $500.99 In deciding if a controversy existed between citizens 
from the different states, the Court in the Removal Cases determined it had 
 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 27–35. 
97 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinatti, & Charleston 
R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844). 
98 Id. Note that the first diversity jurisdiction statute referred to a “suit” instead of a 
“controversy.” See supra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
99 The Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 457 (1879), superseded by statute as recognized in Rothner v. 
City of Chi., 879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 
18 Stat. 470 (1875)). 
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the “power to ascertain the real matter in dispute, and arrange the parties on 
one side or the other of that dispute,” “without regard to the position the 
parties occupied in the pleadings as plaintiffs or defendants.”100 Applying this 
in Corbin v. Van Brunt, the Court had to determine if removal was proper in a 
case concerning a land possession dispute.101 Although diverse citizens were 
procedurally against each other in the lawsuit, the Court determined that the 
“real controversy” over the land only existed between the parties to the lawsuit 
that were from the same state.102 Therefore, removal was not proper.103 
The Supreme Court subsequently applied these principles for 
determining “controversy” in non-removal suits originally filed in federal 
courts. In Dawson v. Columbia Avenue Savings Fund, the Court held that a case 
should have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the 
technical defendant-company had “[n]o difference or collision of interest or 
action [] alleged or even suggested” between it and the plaintiff.104 The Court 
determined that the defendant-company’s interest was aligned with that of 
the plaintiff, which really placed it at odds with another defendant in that 
case—a city of the same citizenship.105 Thus diversity jurisdiction was 
destroyed.106 In another case, when deciding whether a lower federal court 
had indeed properly re-aligned parties based on the controversy in dispute, 
the Court held that what constitutes a controversy is determined by whether 
or not an interest of one party is “adverse” to the interest of another.107 It 
explained that the determination of adverse interests should be based on the 
attitude of the parties “towards the actual and substantial controversy.”108 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the controversy required between 
diverse citizens under Congress’s diversity jurisdiction statute culminated in 
City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank of N.Y., which provided the “greatest 
guidance” for what has come to be known as the realignment doctrine.109 
When deciding if jurisdiction existed under an earlier version of § 1332, the 
Court explained that “[t]o sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an 
actual, substantial controversy between citizens of different states,” and that 
 
100 Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 298 (1879) (discussing the Removal Cases). 
101 105 U.S. 576, 577 (1881). 
102 Id. at 578. 
103 Id.; see also Evers v. Watson, 156 U.S. 527, 532 (1895) (“In such case, it would have been 
perfectly competent for the court to ascertain the real matter in controversy, and to have rearranged 
the parties to the suit upon the opposite sides of such controversy, and thus sustain the jurisdiction 
of the court.”). 
104 197 U.S. 178, 180-81 (1905). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 204 (1918). 
108 Id. 
109 314 U.S. 63 (1941); see also Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, Realigning Parties, 
2014 UTAH L. REV. 109, 114 (citing Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. at 68-70). 
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it is the duty of federal courts “to look beyond the pleadings and arrange the 
parties according to their sides in the dispute.”110 As the Court held, in 
determining whether there is a “necessary collision of interest,” it must be 
“ascertained from the principal purpose of the suit and the primary and 
controlling matter in dispute.”111 
Applying this doctrine to interpleader actions, anytime a strict interpleader 
action is brought between a stakeholder and claimants under Rule 22 and § 1332, 
the “actual” controversy seems to only exist between the claimants. The 
stakeholder makes no claim to the stake at issue and has no interest in which 
claimant ultimately receives it. The primary purposes of interpleader actions 
are to release a disinterested stakeholder from future liability and to determine 
which claimant holds proper title to a stake. As to the purpose of releasing the 
stakeholder from future liability, the stakeholder has no “adverseness” or 
“collision of interests” with the claimants because all parties agree that the 
stakeholder is liable, should release the stake, and can then leave the lawsuit. 
As to the primary purpose of deciding title, the stakeholder is not opposed to 
either claimant receiving the stake at issue. Because the “real” and only 
controversy, or “collision of interests,” appears to only be between the claimants, 
this means that any strict interpleader action brought under Rule 22 and § 1332 
must have completely diverse claimants in order to satisfy the requirements of 
Congress’s general diversity jurisdiction statute. 
Not only does an application of the realignment doctrine lead to the 
conclusion that Rule 22 and § 1332 strict interpleader actions necessitate diverse 
claimants, the Supreme Court appears to have already confirmed this. In 
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., the Sunshine Mining Company, a Washington 
corporation, filed a bill of interpleader under the Federal Interpleader Act of 
1936 against claimants to the Sunshine Mining Company’s stocks.112 The 
adverse claimants were from Washington and Idaho.113 At the time, the Court 
had not yet determined if the Constitution’s Diversity Clause required 
complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants like the 
 
110 Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. at 69 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
111 Id. at 69 (interal citations and quotation marks omitted). In following the Supreme Court’s 
realignment doctrine as articulated in Chase Nat’l Bank, the Circuit Courts are split in applying one 
of two tests. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 109, at 118. Several circuits apply the “substantial-
controversy” test, which requires a federal court to realign the parties if there is no “actual or 
substantial conflict between adverse litigants . . . .” Id. Other circuits apply the “principal-purpose” 
test, in which the “federal court must sort through the issues within the lawsuit, determine the 
lawsuit’s principal purpose, and align the parties according to their positions with respect to that 
particular issue.” Id. 
112 308 U.S. 66, 66-68, 70 (1939) (citation and quotations omitted). 
113 Id. at 68. 
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requirement under Congress’s diversity jurisdiction statute.114 Because the 
plaintiff-stakeholder was not completely diverse from all of the defendant-
claimants, the Court raised on its own motion the question of its jurisdiction 
to hear the case.115 The Court held that it need not decide whether the 
stakeholder needed to be diverse from the claimants under the possibly 
mandated complete diversity requirement because the “real controversy” at 
issue existed “between the adverse claimants,”—not between the stakeholder 
and claimants.116 The Court explained that when the complainant-stakeholder 
deposits money or property involved in the dispute and seeks to be discharged 
from further liability, it demonstrates its “disinterestedness as between the 
claimants and as to the property in dispute, an essential in interpleaders.”117 
Although the Supreme Court did not clearly specify in Treinies the statutory 
or constitutional source of its “controversy” interpretation, the Supreme Court 
seemed to be saying that at a minimum, under Congress’s jurisdictional statutes, 
the “real” controversy in a strict interpleader action is only the dispute that exists 
between the claimants. This Comment later poses that the Treinies Court’s 
understanding of what constitutes a real controversy in interpleader actions 
should also be the understanding of the “controversy” that is required by the 
Constitution.118 However, it can at least be fairly ascertained that in any strict 
interpleader action brought under Rule 22 or Congress’s § 1332 diversity statute, 
the Supreme Court would interpret the only “real” controversy as that between 
the claimants. Thus, any strict interpleader action brought pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and under § 1332 that does not have completely 
diverse claimants contravenes Congress’s statutory grant of jurisdiction to hear 
cases between citizens from different states. 
B. The Controversy Requirement of Article III 
Article III extends federal judicial power to hear “controversies” between 
citizens of different states.119 However, the Supreme Court has only 
interpreted the meaning of the “controversy” requirement between diverse 
citizens against the backdrop of congressional diversity jurisdiction statutes 
and has never specified if its interpretation applies to both the diversity 
statute and the Constitution’s Diversity Clause. Importantly, the Supreme 
Court has articulated that the real “controversy” in a strict interpleader action 
 
114 See id. at 71 (“For the determination of the validity of the Interpleader Act we need not decide 
whether the words of the Constitution, ‘Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States,’ have 
a different meaning from that given by judicial construction to similar words in the Judiciary Act.”). 
115 Id. at 70. 
116 Id. at 71-72. 
117 Id. at 72. 
118 See infra Section II.B. 
119 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
490 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 467 
exists only between the claimants but has not explicitly specified whether it 
came to this conclusion based on an interpretation of Congress’s jurisdictional 
statutes, or the Constitution itself. Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of 
specificity, this Comment argues that the constitutional “controversy” in strict 
interpleader actions must also be interpreted to encompass only the dispute 
between the claimants. 
Beginning with the text of Article III, Webster’s dictionary defined 
“controversy” near the time of ratification as a “dispute,” “debate,” and 
“agitation of contrary opinions.”120 It also described a “controversy” as a “suit 
in law; a case in which opposing parties contend for their respective claims 
before a tribunal.”121 Further, the text of Article III is notable overall because 
in some instances it extends the judicial power to “all Cases,” while in other 
instances, it only extends the judicial power to “Controversies.”122 Webster’s 
Dictionary near the time of ratification provided a much broader definition 
for “case” than “controversy,” defining it as “that which falls, comes, or 
happens; an event.”123 Similarly, in a 1792 dictionary, “case” was defined as 
“state of a legal question.”124 It would seem, then, that if the Constitution’s 
textual distinction between “Cases” and “Controversies” is to be given any 
importance that “Controversy” must have some adversarial meaning that is 
narrower than “Cases” in which legal questions are presented to the courts.125 
 
120 Controversy, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/
controversy [https://perma.cc/PT7L-4PVG] (last visited July 31, 2019) [hereinafter 1828 Controversy]. 
Merriam-Webster similarly defines controversy today as “a discussion marked especially by the 
expression of opposing views.” Controversy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/controversy [https://perma.cc/AR9C-TFEW] (last visited July 31, 2019). 
121 1828 Controversy, supra note 120. 
122 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . under their 
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . ;—to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party . . . .”). 
123 Case, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/case 
[https://perma.cc/KLK5-J4TZ] (last visited July 31, 2019). 
124 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: CASE (10th ed. 1792), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=j-UIAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false 
[https://perma.cc/2A3S-UCWG]. 
125 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1499 (1990) (analyzing the related distinction in Article III between “all cases” and just 
“controversies” in assessing whether Congress has power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over 
certain cases). Professors Bassett and Perschbacher point out that while “[t]here is support in both 
case law and legal commentary for the notion that ‘case’ is a broader term than ‘controversy,’” the 
distinction may not be significant because “three-hundred-years of legal practice and tradition” have 
established that both require an adversarial suit. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 109, at 126-27. 
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The Federalist Papers provide little insight as to how people at the time 
of ratification thought about the meaning of “controversy.”126 However, it is 
widely understood that the Constitution’s requirement of diverse citizens was 
meant to (1) prevent state court bias by state judges in controversies between 
citizens of different states where there is a potential for the judge to favor the 
local party or (2) prevent state-based bias from the legislature in controversies 
between citizens of different states where there is a potential for state laws to 
favor the local party.127 It has also recently been posited that the Constitution’s 
Diversity Clause had the purpose of providing jurisdiction to federal courts 
when no single state government could address matters of national interest 
on its own due to territorial constraints.128 Even so, the grant of diversity 
jurisdiction to federal courts was hotly contested and viewed as unnecessary 
by many. Diversity jurisdiction was ultimately ratified but under promises 
and understandings that it would not extend too far.129 
Thus, the Diversity Clause and its “controversy” requirement can be 
construed in one of two ways. First, it could be interpreted broadly to include 
any instance in which a citizen from one state is procedurally placed against a 
citizen of another state in litigation. If the Diversity Clause’s controversy 
requirement is interpreted in this first, broader fashion, then it is clear that 
when a disinterested stakeholder of State A brings State B claimants to court, 
federal courts have diversity jurisdiction to hear the case because the 
stakeholder is on one side of the case and is diverse from the claimants placed 
on the other side. However, it is questionable whether Article III’s controversy 
requirement was written so that it could be easily disposed by litigation devices 
that place one party before the v. and the other parties after it.130 
 
126 All mentions of “controversy” throughout the Federalist Papers use it in passing to discuss 
different provisions of the Constitution without discussing how people at the time viewed the meaning 
of a “controversy.” See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 16–17; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[Congress] believed that, consciously or otherwise, the courts 
of a state may favor their own citizens. Bias against outsiders may become embedded in a judgment 
of a state court and yet not be sufficiently apparent to be made the basis of a federal claim.”). 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 21–26. 
129 See supra text accompanying note 20. Many scholars have since argued to either limit or abolish 
diversity jurisdiction altogether in federal courts. See, e.g., 20 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 25 n.17 (2d ed. 2018) (listing numerous 
articles arguing for abolishment or constraint of diversity jurisdiction in federal courts); Adrienne J. 
Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197 (1982) 
(arguing for restrictions to be placed on diversity jurisdiction). 
130 This issue does raise an interesting question regarding Congress’s ability to define by 
statute the citizenship of corporations. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2018). Although this in essence gives 
Congress some authority in defining who is “diverse,” and thus what satisfies the Constitution’s 
Diversity Clause, this Comment’s author believes that this authority is not unrestrained—that is, 
Congress could only define the citizenship of a corporation within reasonable limitations. After all, 
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The second possible interpretation is that the Constitution’s Diversity 
Clause only allows federal jurisdiction in cases when there is a state-law-based 
legal issue in dispute between at least two parties from different states. This 
interpretation honors the definition of “controversy” near the time of 
ratification, which entailed an actual “dispute” in which the parties on each 
side of the controversy stood in opposition. Further, the latter interpretation 
better honors the suggested purposes of the Diversity Clause. If the purpose 
was meant to prevent the potential for any state-based bias against out-of-
state parties, this interpretation allows courts to focus on the parties to which 
a material controversy exists where state bias could creep in. Additionally, if 
the Diversity Clause’s purpose was to provide for jurisdiction over national 
matters which state governments could not resolve themselves, the narrower 
interpretation allows courts to assess if the matter in question is really one in 
which a controversy implicates national interests. 
Thus, this Comment argues that the proper interpretation of the 
Diversity Clause’s controversy requirement should require adverse parties, 
not procedurally opposing parties, to be diverse—similar to how the Court 
has interpreted the “controversy” requirement against the backdrop of 
Congress’s diversity jurisdiction statutes.131 And when a stakeholder comes to 
court asking to leave its fund behind and be discharged from any future 
liability, that stakeholder is not adverse to either claimant of the fund. It is 
adverse solely to the possible injustice of double vexation. Interpleader is 
equitable relief, not a recognition that a controversy has been established 
between the stakeholder and the claimants of the fund. To interpret 
“controversy” to encompass the disinterested stakeholder versus the adverse 
claimants would allow Article III to encompass any case, not just controversy, 
that contains some diverse party even if no genuine legal dispute between 
citizens of different states exists. 
This second, narrower interpretation is also supported by the Supreme 
Court’s holdings about the meaning of “controversy” in jurisdictional contexts. 
As discussed earlier, the Court has only spoken on the meaning of 
“controversy” when interpreting jurisdictional statutes. There, a “controversy” 
requires adverse parties to an actual or substantial controversy in which the 
 
the Constitution’s mandate that diversity jurisdiction be based in part on citizens from “different 
States” should have some limiting meaning. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
131 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (ordering the district court to 
dismiss a lawsuit in which collusion between the defendant and the plaintiff caused there to be no 
“genuine adversary issue” and the lawsuit lacked the “‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of 
rights’ to be adjudicated—a safeguard . . . which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication 
of constitutional questions by this Court” (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892))). 
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parties’ interests collide.132 However, these holdings should be understood as 
also saying something about the meaning of “controversy” under the 
Constitution. As recently argued by Professors Bassett and Perschbacher, 
these decisions should be understood as grounded in the Constitution for 
several reasons, including that: (1) what is known as the “realignment doctrine” 
has been applied in contexts besides those concerning only diversity 
jurisdiction;133 (2) “realignment serves an important constitutional purpose in 
ensuring the adversity necessary to the constitutional case-or-controversy 
requirement”;134 (3) it has long been accepted that a “controversy” must be 
more narrowly defined than a “case”;135 and, finally, (4) “[t]he Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that the adversarial context is crucial to satisfying the 
case-or-controversy requirement” of the Constitution.136 
If any question remained as to whether the Court’s realignment doctrine 
requiring diversity between adverse legal interests spoke to an exclusively 
statutory or constitutional requirement, the Supreme Court spoke more 
clearly about Article III’s outer constitutional limits in another context: The 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.137 The Declaratory Judgment Act grants 
power to the United States courts to “declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.”138 In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 
the Supreme Court held that the Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural 
device created by Congress that can provide relief to the extent that it is 
“consonant with the exercise of judicial function in the determination of 
controversies to which under the Constitution the judicial power extends.”139 
In Aetna, an insurance company brought an action against an insured seeking 
a declaration that the insured was not entitled to disability benefits due to the 
insured’s non-payment of premiums.140 The Court held that a controversy 
existed because the parties faced each other in an adversary proceeding 
contesting the “legal rights and obligations arising from the contracts of 
insurance.”141 Specifically, the parties took “adverse positions with respect to 
 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 99–111. 
133 Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 109, at 113. 
134 Id. at 114. 
135 Id. at 126. 
136 Id. at 128. 
137 Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2201 (2018)). 
138 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018). 
139 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). 
140 Id. at 238. 
141 Id. at 242. 
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their existing obligations.”142 While the insured believed he was entitled to be 
paid benefits, the insurance company believed no right existed.143 
The Court’s general description of what constitutes a “controversy” does 
not appear to be based only on statutory interpretation, but also on general 
principles of diversity jurisdiction—constitutional and statutory alike. Thus, 
this Comment proceeds with the claim that a constitutional “controversy” 
between diverse citizens must include a collision of legal interests. 
Using this interpretation, then, every time a stakeholder brings a strict 
interpleader action using Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
against claimants who are citizens of the same state, and where no federal 
question is at issue, any exercise of federal power over that case contravenes 
the Constitution. When the stakeholder deposits the stake with the court and 
is discharged from the lawsuit, leaving the claimants to battle out the question 
of the stake’s title, federal courts are repeatedly left deciding legal questions 
between the claimants, the true adverse parties. 
While some may claim that the stakeholder has an interest in the dispute 
between the claimants being resolved,144 its interest is much like a spectator 
at a sports game. It may watch to see who wins, but the spectator would never 
be considered a member of the team playing the game. This is not to say that 
the stakeholder presents no question to the court when it files suit. The 
stakeholder very clearly says to the court: “Can you please confirm that I am 
liable and take my money?” But neither claimant is at odds or adverse to this 
question. This stands in stark contrast to cases brought under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act in which plaintiffs routinely bring actions in advance of being 
sued themselves because they seek declaration on an answer to a legal 
question for which the defendant would seek the opposite answer.145 Rather, 
in an interpleader action, the claimants are aligned and on the same team 
when it comes to convincing the court that the answer is yes: the stakeholder 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. Note that some stakeholders do in fact claim some interest in the stake at issue but those 
cases are actions in the “nature of interpleader” for which this Comment’s thesis does not extend. 
See supra text accompanying note 55. 
144 See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp. 967, 971-72 (W.D. Ky. 1936)(arguing 
that the stakeholder-insurance company in the interpleader action at issue was not a nominal party 
to the lawsuit because there was a substantial risk the insurance company would have multiple 
lawsuits brought against it otherwise). 
145 E.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120-22 (2007) (noting that the 
plaintiff below sought a declaration that a patent was invalid so that it would not be required to pay 
royalties to the patent holder and that the defendant was opposed to such a declaration because it 
sought to receive those very royalties); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1995) (noting 
that the insurance company sought a declaration that its policies did not cover the insured but the 
insured opposed it). 
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is indeed liable to one of the claimants—which is the only legal question the 
stakeholder hopes the court will answer.146 
Despite statutory and persuasive constitutional understandings of the 
meaning of “controversy” in the state-based diversity context, federal courts 
have almost robotically accepted that if the stakeholder bringing the 
interpleader action under Rule 22 and § 1332 is diverse from the claimants on 
the other side, and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000, the 
court has subject-matter jurisdiction. And they have held onto this conclusion 
despite Supreme Court holdings concerning interpleader actions that may 
point to a contrary conclusion. 
C. Supreme Court Precedent Requiring Diverse Claimants in Strict   
Interpleader Actions 
Before Rule 22 went into effect, early cases brought under the 
Interpleader Act or in equity rarely discussed or raised the question of 
diversity jurisdiction.147 When the question was raised, state and lower federal 
courts had mixed views about whether the Constitution required diversity 
between claimants, as well as whether the Constitution required diversity 
between the stakeholder bringing the interpleader suit and the claimants. 
When courts did hold that diverse claimants are constitutionally necessary, 
they focused on the question of which parties the “real” controversy was 
between in the interpleader action. In 1883, an interpleader suit in 
Massachusetts state court was not granted removal to a U.S. district court 
because “the claimants were both citizens of Massachusetts and the 
stakeholder was a New York corporation.”148 Similarly in 1902, the District of 
Connecticut disregarded the stakeholder in determining whether diversity 
jurisdiction existed over an interpleader action, asserting that it “leaves the 
[claimants] to fight their own battles.”149 The court held that it was “without 
doubt” that the claimants in the case were on the opposite sides of the 
controversy at issue, and because they were diverse from each other, the court 
maintained subject-matter jurisdiction.150 In 1921, the Southern District of 
California also asserted that, for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction, 
 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 41–43. 
147 See Chafee, supra note 54, at 1142-43 (“This [diversity between the claimants] objection, 
however, does not appear to have been raised in any of the reported cases in the United States 
courts . . . . [T]he question whether complete diversity of citizenship is necessary for original bills 
of interpleader has not yet been satisfactorily adjudicated.”). 
148 Id. at 1142 (citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 134 Mass. 389 (1883)). 
149 First Nat’l Bank v. Bridgeport Trust Co., 117 F. 969, 970 (D. Conn. 1902). 
150 Id. at 971. 
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in an interpleader action the “real and seemingly only controversy in the case 
is between the claimants.”151 
Not all courts believed diverse citizenship between adverse claimants was 
required. In Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, the Northern District of Oklahoma 
held that even though all the claimants were residents of Oklahoma, the court 
had jurisdiction because the stakeholder-plaintiff was diverse from the 
claimants.152 The court reached its conclusion because it defined a 
“controversy” as any instance in which “any property or claim of the parties 
of diverse citizenship, capable of pecuniary estimation, in the amount of 
$3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, is the subject of litigation and is 
presented by the pleadings for a judicial determination.”153 Not only does this 
definition of “controversy” seem to be a circular restatement of congressional 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction, but it also extends controversies to 
include any instances in which some question is presented by the pleadings 
to the court between two parties that are diverse. 
Although the state and lower federal courts differed in their opinions as 
to how to treat the diversity of claimants as required by the Constitution, it 
appears that the Supreme Court has given a direct answer more than once. 
Both times, its answers have gotten lost in the wind. As discussed earlier,154 
in Treinies, the Supreme Court had to decide if complete diversity was present 
in a strict interpleader case in which the adverse claimants were diverse 
(Idaho and Washington) but not wholly diverse from the disinterested 
stakeholder (Washington).155 The action was properly brought under the 
Federal Interpleader Act—as opposed to Rule 22 and Congress’s diversity 
jurisdiction statute—which only required at least one diverse claimant; 
however, at the time, the Supreme Court had not decided yet if complete 
diversity was a constitutional requirement or a requirement under Congress’s 
general diversity jurisdiction statute.156 If the Court found that complete 
diversity did not exist due to the stakeholder’s citizenship, it would have had 
to decide whether complete diversity was a constitutional requirement that 
would be imposed on interpleader suits despite the “minimal diversity” that 
the Federal Interpleader Act requires. 
The Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Interpleader Act’s 
requirement of diversity between claimants was “based upon the clause of 
Section Two, Article III, of the Constitution which extends the judicial 
 
151 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lott, 275 F. 365, 372 (S.D. Cal. 1921). 
152 8 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Okla. 1934). 
153 Id. at 872-73. 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 112–117. 
155 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 68, 70 (1939) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
156 Id. at 71. 
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power of the United States to controversies ‘between citizens of different 
States.’”157 The Court then reasoned that complete diversity was present in 
this case—despite the stakeholder being nondiverse from one of the 
claimants—because the “real controversy” at issue was between “the adverse 
claimants.”158 Thus, it viewed the only controversy at issue in the entirety of 
the case as the controversy between the claimants. The Court’s holding is 
best understood as interpreting the constitutional—and not merely a 
statutory—“controversy” requirement in strict interpleader actions to entail 
only the dispute between the claimants, not between the stakeholder and 
claimants. It would be hard to read the case as interpreting any statutory 
“controversy” requirement because the case was brought under the Federal 
Interpleader Act, which does not contain the word “controversy” itself. 
Further, the Court expressly seemed to recognize that the Federal 
Interpleader Act’s adverse claimant requirement was based on the 
“controversy” required by the Constitution’s Diversity Clause. 
In a Harvard Law Review article analyzing multiparty litigation in the late 
1950s, the author noted that in light of the Treinies precedent, which treated 
the disinterested stakeholders “as a nominal party,” it would seem that “a case 
in which all the claimants are citizens of one state and the [stakeholder] is a 
citizen of another state would seem to lack even . . . minimal diversity . . . .”159 
Yet, the article noted a strange occurrence that despite Treinies, the lower 
federal courts continued to entertain interpleader actions under Rule 22 “on 
the ground that the usual test of diversity between all the plaintiffs and all the 
defendants had been met.”160 
Perhaps the fact that Treinies presented an issue under the Federal 
Interpleader Act provides the historical reason for why the case became 
overlooked by judges and their clerks when deciding if lower federal courts 
had jurisdiction over interpleader actions in which no claimants were diverse. 
However, the Supreme Court spoke a second time on this issue in State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,161 which is well-known for the very reason that it 
held for the first time that minimal diversity, not complete diversity, is all 
that Article III requires.162 Nonetheless, courts seem to have forgotten that 
 
157 Id. at 71. 
158 Id. at 71-72. 
159 Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, supra note 57, at 922. 
160 Id. 
161 386 U.S. 523 (1967). 
162 See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court Judges 
and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial” and “Competent” 
Federal Courts: A Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal 
and State Courts, 1925–2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 494 (2012) (citing Tashire, 386 U.S. 
at 530-31 (1967)) (“In 1967, the Court decided State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, explaining 
its decision in Strawbridge and declaring that the ‘complete diversity’ rule is a statutory rather than 
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the case was about constitutional, jurisdictional requirements over 
interpleader actions. In Tashire, an insurance company deposited into the 
court the proceeds of an insurance policy after its insured was in an accident 
and asked the Court to decide to whom the insurance proceeds belonged 
among multiple claimants.163 Only two of the multiple claimants were diverse 
from each other.164 The Court decided to address on its own motion whether 
it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.165 It recognized that the 
action was brought under Congress’s interpleader statute, which provides that 
there must be “[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship,” but 
that the statutory language itself did not require that all adverse claimants be 
diverse.166 The question the Court had to answer was whether this “minimal 
diversity” between adverse parties was constitutional or if the Constitution 
itself required complete diversity in that all the parties adverse to each other 
had to be from different states.167 The Court answered that Congress’s 
statutory requirement that only two or more claimants be diverse was all that 
the Constitution required.168 Here, and in light of Treinies, it seems that the 
Court was saying that two or more adverse claimants is enough to establish 
“minimal diversity” in an interpleader suit—but not less. 
It is curious that the Supreme Court seems to have spoken as to which 
parties a constitutional “controversy” exists between in strict interpleader 
actions yet no lower federal courts have been applying its precedent. The best 
explanation seems to be that because Treinies and Tashire were both addressing 
interpleader actions under the Federal Interpleader Act, they were overlooked 
as precedent when deciding jurisdiction requirements under Rule 22. Some 
may argue that perhaps lower federal courts have developed a sort of 
“protective jurisdiction” in the diversity jurisdiction context over interpleader 
actions. This argument can be disposed of as follows. 
It has long been understood that the Constitution provides the outer 
bounds of subject-matter jurisdiction for federal courts, with some of those 
bounds being cases arising from federal questions or controversies between 
 
a constitutional requirement.”); Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdiction Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1127 
n.132 (2013) (citing Tashire for the proposition that Article III only requires minimal diversity); see 
also John J. Watkins, The “Other” Diversity: Federal Alienage Jurisdiction, 1997 ARK. L. NOTES 77, 86 
& n.68 (1997) (“Every first year law student learns that diversity of citizenship must be complete; 
that is, every plaintiff must be of diverse citizenship from every defendant. This principle, which 
dates to the venerable case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, is a matter of statutory construction; for its part, 
Article III requires only ‘minimal’ diversity.” (citing Tashire, 386 U.S. at 530-31 (1967))). 
163 386 U.S. at 526-27. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 530. 
166 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2018)). 
167 Id. at 530-31. 
168 Id. 
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diverse parties.169 However, beginning in the mid-twentieth century Professor 
Wechsler introduced an articulated theory of “protective jurisdiction.”170 He 
argued that if Congress had the power to enact rules of decision over a subject 
matter, it could also grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases concerning 
the subject matter.171 Professor Mishkin took this theory a step further and 
opined that Congress could extend the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear any 
cases “implicating federal powers or interests, even though the legal claims at 
issue rest on state law.”172 The thrust of protective jurisdiction is that, if 
endorsed, it allows Congress to use its Article I powers to go beyond the 
bounds of judicial power articulated in Article III.173 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed a theory of 
protective jurisdiction, its decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria174 
is viewed by many as implicitly applying some form of it.175 At issue in 
Verlinden was the Article III constitutionality of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, which “authoriz[ed] a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign 
state in a United States district court on a nonfederal cause of action . . . .”176 
Prior to the Act, the question of sovereign immunity of foreign states in 
federal and state courts was decided on a case-by-case basis. In response, the 
Act was passed “in order to free the Government from the case-by-case 
diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to assure litigants 
that decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that 
 
169 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
170 FALLON, supra note 33, at 800-01 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the 
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948)). 
171 Id. 
172 See Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and 
Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1775 (2007) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 
“Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-96 (1953)). 
173 See Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the 
Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 364 (2002) (“[T]he theory of protective jurisdiction allows 
Congress to further Article I interests by creating federal jurisdiction for nonfederal cases.”). For a 
more thorough discussion on the theories of protective jurisdiction, see James E. Pfander, Protective 
Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1428-30 (2007). 
174 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
175 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 205 (1990) (“What is remarkable about Verlinden . . . is that the Court 
rejected the theory of protective jurisdiction while pragmatically embracing its concrete application. 
The Supreme Court seems to be saying ‘do what I do, not what I say.’”); Segall, supra note 173, at 
380-81 (“Verlinden is incomplete and unpersuasive. . . . There was nothing federal about the lawsuit 
other than the [issue of] sovereign immunity. The FSIA, however, clearly denotes this question as 
jurisdictional, not substantive . . . and the legislative history shows that is exactly what Congress 
intended.” (footnotes omitted)); Carlos M. Vázquez, The Federal Claim in the District Courts: Osborn, 
Verlinden, and Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1731, 1740 (2007) (“In any given case it may 
be so clear that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA’s immunity provisions 
that a foreign state would be highly unlikely to raise a claim of immunity.”). 
176 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 482. 
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insure [sic] due process.”177 Because of the “potential sensitivity of actions 
against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law 
in this area,” the Act also provided that foreign states could “remove any civil 
action from a state to federal court.”178 
The Court had to decide whether the Act exceeded the scope of the federal 
courts’ judicial power permitted by the Constitution when a civil action 
between foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereigns concerned only a rule of 
decision based on state law. The Court first explained that “Congress may not 
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds established by 
the Constitution.”179 Because diversity jurisdiction under the Constitution was 
not written broadly enough to cover actions by foreign plaintiffs, the Court 
had to turn to deciding whether the Act could be considered a grant of 
jurisdiction under the Constitution’s clause permitting jurisdiction for all cases 
“arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made . . . .”180 The Court unanimously viewed the case as one arising under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States “[b]y reason of [Congress’s] 
authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations . . . .”181 The Court held 
that the question that would arise in each case was whether a foreign sovereign 
was immune from suit, which was a “question[] of substantive federal law” that 
“clearly ‘arises under’ federal law.”182 The Court held that Congress could enact 
a statute “comprehensively regulating the amenability of foreign nations to 
suit in the United States” under its Article I powers.183 
A generous reading of Verlinden would have no implications for this 
Comment. A generous reading would lead one to conclude that clearly the 
decision of foreign sovereign immunity is a substantive one; it is a decision that 
Congress can address under its Article I powers. And because that decision is a 
substantive question of federal law, the Verlinden Court said nothing new about 
the judicial power and the inability of Congress to transgress those bounds no 
matter its federal interest. Anything less than a generous reading would lead 
one to conclude that really the question of immunity is jurisdictional. If the 
question is jurisdictional, the only way the Verlinden opinion can be squared is 
if the Court is really endorsing the theory that Congress can pass jurisdictional 
rules and grant jurisdiction to the federal courts based on the mere fact that the 
case arises under that jurisdictional rule so long as Congress has some proper 
 
177 Id. at 488 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). 
178 Id. at 489 (citation and quotations omitted). 
179 Id. at 491 (citing Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Kline v. Burke 
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
180 Id. at 492; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
181 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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Article I federal interest in the subject matter—even if that jurisdictional rule 
brings cases into the ambit of judicial power that involve only state law 
questions between nondiverse parties.184 Although some prefer this broader 
reading of Verlinden and the implications it has for expanding federal 
jurisdiction over cases merely through Congress’s ability to act on its Article I 
authority,185 this reading goes beyond Verlinden’s facts186 and such a reading 
would seem to create an empty shell out of Article III. 
Although this author believes that Congress should not be able to create 
jurisdiction by the mere fact that it enacts federal jurisdictional statutes when 
it has a federal interest, a question lingers based on the Verlinden line of 
scholarship with implications for this Comment: Is every interpleader case 
that arrives in federal courts under Rule 22 really just a case that Congress 
has granted federal jurisdiction over because of some federal interest in seeing 
these case adjudicated—even if, as this Comment argues, such a case 
transgresses the normal scope of Article III judicial power? 
If the answer is yes, then that would mean that even if the Article III 
Diversity Clause in strict interpleader cases requires minimally diverse 
claimants, as this Comment argues, Congress could still have granted federal 
courts jurisdiction to hear these interpleader cases if it had some federal 
interest in the subject matter to be adjudicated. Luckily, interpleader is not 
currently an area where this question can be implicated. Even if Verlinden is 
taken at its worst—standing for the proposition that Congress’s federal 
interest in creating jurisdiction over certain cases gives it authority to enact 
jurisdictional statutes expanding Article III jurisdiction itself—Congress has 
not yet expanded jurisdiction over interpleader cases in this way. And if there 
is anything that is clear about the theory of protective jurisdiction, it is that 
the theory is implicated only if Congress has passed some statute seeming to 
grant jurisdiction beyond normal Article III limitations in the first place. 
Congress has acted twice in the interpleader context. It first acted by passing 
the Federal Interpleader Act, in which it clearly limited interpleader to cases 
where claimants were minimally diverse—which this Comment argues is the 
level of diversity required by Article III of the Constitution.187 Congress then 
enacted Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it was made clear 
 
184 See Mullenix, supra note 175, at 174-75 & n.21 (1990) (citing George T. Conway III, 
Comment, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099, 1113-16 (1987)) 
(discussing how Conway has read Verlinden to stand for this proposition in order to support access 
to multidistrict litigation cases in federal court based on this theory of protective jurisdiction). 
185 Id. at 176 (citations omitted) (discussing Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein’s support for 
the theory that Congress can grant jurisdiction over non-federal law cases using its commerce powers). 
186 Id. at 201 (“Verlinden is a poorly articulated and unfortunate decision for protective jurisdiction 
enthusiasts because it provides little support for theories of expansive article III jurisdiction.”). 
187 See supra text accompanying notes 65–69. 
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that the Rules were supposed to be no source of jurisdiction themselves,188 
which meant that jurisdiction for cases using the Rules had to conform with 
Congress’s other, much more restrictive, jurisdictional statutes such as § 1331 
and § 1332.189 Thus, because Congress has not tried to pass a statute 
broadening jurisdiction in an interpleader context in a way that would permit 
suits between nondiverse claimants, no protective jurisdiction theory can be 
invoked as a possible reason for these suits being permitted in federal court. 
Of course, hypothetically Congress could try to pass a broader 
interpleader statute in the future that only requires diversity between 
stakeholders and claimants. And if there is no federal question arising in that 
case and there are nondiverse claimants, then Congress could claim it has 
some commercial interest in seeing the matter adjudicated even though the 
case would go beyond Article III jurisdiction. 
In many instances, Congress will have little interest in ensuring that 
federal courts can hear lawsuits that involve only state-law questions of title 
among that state’s citizens.190 However, one could envision Congress seeking 
to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution that prevents stakeholders 
from being subjected to multiple, burdensome lawsuits that might arrive at 
inconsistent results. For example, imagine the scenario in which a defeated 
claimant of a strict interpleader action brings a second suit in state court 
against the stakeholder. The proper response of the state court would be to 
dismiss the lawsuit not only because it would have discharged the stakeholder 
from all future liability in the original interpleader action, but also because it 
would have already issued a judgment against the defeated claimant. 
Congress’s interest in acting preemptively to prevent possible cases in which 
multistate parties could be subject to state abuse certainly seems valid; 
however, this Comment’s author strongly believes that no matter Congress’s 
Article I interest at issue, Congress may not use its Article I powers to violate 
the bounds of Article III. 
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has been moving away from 
endorsing any theory of protective jurisdiction,191 and this Comment’s author 
 
188 Rule 82 states “[t]hese rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or 
the venue of actions in those courts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
189 See infra text accompanying note 212. 
190 If strict interpleader cases between nondiverse claimants involve only questions of state law 
between claimants, should Congress care? The idea that federal courts should be in the business of 
helping create uniform state law was dispelled long ago in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
191 Several years after its Verlinden decision, the Supreme Court had to address whether U.S. 
Postal Service employees could remove state criminal prosecutions to federal court for on-duty 
traffic violations under a jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2018). Mesa v. California, 489 
U.S. 121, 123 (1989). The statute seemed to broadly authorize removal by federal employees such as 
those of the U.S. Postal Service, but the Court interpreted the statute to require a “colorable federal 
defense.” Id. at 124-25, 129. In considering the broader interpretation the Court held that the statute 
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believes that endorsing such a theory would void Article III of its purpose,192 
the constitutionality of such an act is a question that will have to be answered 
another day. Further, it is a question that does not have any bearing on the 
conclusion of this Comment as interpleader currently stands. Nor does the 
possibility that the Supreme Court could one day accept a theory of 
protective jurisdiction say anything about the meaning of Article III as 
proposed in this Comment, because such a theory allows Congress to use its 
Article I powers to go beyond Article III’s express limitations. 
There is one remaining way that Congress could try to grant federal court 
jurisdiction over strict interpleader actions between stakeholders and co-citizen 
claimants that is grounded in an interpretation of what Article III itself 
permits. Congress could argue that Article III diversity jurisdiction extends to 
any case in which a controversy “might” arise between citizens from different 
states even if the case does not begin that way. In every interpleader action, 
there is a possibility that a dispute could arise between the co-citizen claimants 
and the stakeholder. This dispute would most likely take the form of a claim 
alleging that the stakeholder had not delivered the full amount of the stake that 
the claimants believed they were entitled to receive. Thus, a strict interpleader 
action always has the potential to be transformed into an action in the nature 
of interpleader, in which the claimants and stakeholder stand on opposing sides 
of a legal issue to be resolved. Whether the judicial power extends to cases that 
could at some point involve “controversies between citizens from different 
States” is a question that has never been addressed by the Supreme Court. 
Understanding Article III as encompassing the potential for courts to hear 
Article III diversity cases prophylactically, rather than through traditional 
methods such as a removal, is an expansive view of Article III’s bounds. But it 
seems at least more plausible than the idea that Congress could use its Article 
I powers to extend jurisdiction beyond what Article III expressly permits. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Verlinden, Chief Justice Marshall 
originally interpreted Article III federal question jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank 
of the United States193 as permitting “Congress [to] confer on the federal courts 
jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of 
 
was “a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction 
over cases in which a federal officer is a defendant” and “therefore, cannot independently support 
Article III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 136. The Court reasoned that it would not “abandon a 
longstanding reading” of the statute’s requirement that there be a federal defense sufficient for 
Article III in light of an alternative, broader reading that would not arise under Article III and thus 
“raise[] serious constitutional doubt.” Id. at 137. 
192 But see Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1389, 1392 (2010) (arguing for a revival of the theory that Congress can permit federal court 
jurisdiction over cases that advance its Article I interests despite Article III limitations). 
193 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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federal law.”194 Noting that “[t]he breadth of that conclusion has been 
questioned,” the Verlinden Court did not decide to affirm or reject whether 
the Constitution extends federal question jurisdiction over cases in which 
there is “a mere speculative possibility that a federal question may arise at 
some point in the proceeding.”195 Even if the Court decided one day to cut 
against the legal scholarship questioning the permissibility of the breadth of 
this kind of jurisdiction,196 it does not mean that this interpretation should be 
stamped onto the Diversity Clause. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would interpret the federal judicial power to extend to cases 
in the diversity context in which controversy might happen between citizens 
from different states but has not occurred at the outset of litigation. 
To summarize, the following principles have now been established. First, 
a “controversy” under the Constitution and Congress’s diversity statutes 
entails a necessary collision of interests. Furthermore, Supreme Court 
holdings in Tashire and Treinies both seem to establish that for interpleader 
cases, the necessary collision of interests is between the adverse claimants. 
However, Congress has not granted federal courts any statutory authority to 
hear strict interpleader claims in federal courts when there are no diverse 
claimants, and Verlinden should not be interpreted as permitting Congress to 
use its Article I powers to extend jurisdiction beyond what Article III permits. 
Finally, Article III diversity jurisdiction should not yet be interpreted to 
involve any case in which diversity might arise at some point in the lawsuit. 
This leaves only one question: what is happening in the lower federal courts? 
D. The Persistent Impermissible Use of Rule 22 to Hear Strict Interpleader 
Actions Between Nondiverse Claimants in Federal Courts 
Even though the Supreme Court appears to have spoken on the issue of 
whether the Constitution and Congress’s diversity jurisdiction statute requires 
at least two adverse and diverse claimants in a strict interpleader action, 
federal district and appellate courts have adopted standard, recycled language 
to the contrary. The jurisdictional boilerplate language explains that there are 
two kinds of interpleader in federal courts which have different diversity 
requirements, and that under Rule 22, all that is needed is diversity between 
the plaintiff-stakeholder and the defendant-claimants along with at least 
$75,000 at stake. An example of the oft-repeated explanation goes like this: 
 
194 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983). 
195 Id. at 492-93. 
196 For a list of dissenting scholarship, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising 
Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 266 n.8 (2007). 
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Interpleader may be brought in federal court under either the Federal 
Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988), or under Rule 22 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule interpleader “in no way supersedes or limits” 
the remedy available under the Act. . . . 
The central distinction between statutory interpleader and rule interpleader 
is the basis for a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction under each. The Act 
requires that two or more of the adverse claimants to a contested fund be “of 
diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332 of this title.” Rule 22, however, 
“is merely a procedural device; it confers no jurisdiction on the federal courts.” 
Thus, an interpleader brought under Rule 22 must fall within one of the 
general statutory grants of federal jurisdiction. This, of course, may include 
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; thus, in contrast to section 1335, which 
focuses on the diversity of the claimant-defendants, Rule 22 (per section 1332) 
requires diversity between the plaintiff-stakeholder and the claimants.197 
Although there have been hundreds of cases in the federal district courts 
using Rule 22 to interplead parties in a lawsuit,198 there have been few 
instances in which a court has explained why it believed diverse claimants are 
not required in a Rule 22 action brought under § 1332. The majority of cases 
that have raised the subject-matter jurisdiction question have simply presented 
circular arguments. They explain that federal courts can exercise jurisdiction 
over instances in which the claimants are co-citizens because the stakeholder 
is diverse, making the parties on one side of the litigation diverse from the 
parties on the other side of the litigation. But they fail to explain why the setup 
of the case is enough to satisfy constitutional and § 1332 requirements.199 
 
197 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(emphasis and internal citations omitted). 
198 A search of federal dockets on Bloomberg Law for all interpleader actions based on diversity 
jurisdiction under § 1332 reveals over 1,000 results. What is telling, however, is how few of these 
cases actually discuss their jurisdiction. Searches on Westlaw for cases discussing diversity 
jurisdiction under FED. R. CIV. P. 22 reveal far fewer results. 
199 See In re $323,647.60 in Funds Belonging to Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe, No. 18-01194, 2019 WL 
687832, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2019) (“Here, none of the representatives of the Plaintiff Class are citizens 
of California, and the Defendants-in-Interpleader are all citizens of California.”); Primerica Life Ins. Co. 
v. Montoya, No. 18-00109, 2018 WL 3068059, at *2 (D.N.M. June 21, 2018) (“Primerica’s rule interpleader 
properly invoked diversity jurisdiction because at the time of filing its complaint [the stakeholder] was 
of diverse citizenship from each [claimant] . . . . [T]he remaining claimants[’] . . . citizenship is 
immaterial as long as complete diversity exists between them and Primerica.”); Transamerica Life Ins. 
Co. v. Maas, No. 16-4419, 2017 WL 4891528, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017) (“In Rule 22 interpleader actions, 
it is well-settled that . . . the stakeholder must be diverse from the claimants, but the claimants need not 
be diverse from each other . . . . Thus, the Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over this action.” 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Regions Bank v. Lamb, No. 16-00078, 2017 WL 780575, 
at *1 & nn.1-2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2017) (describing it as “undisputed” that the court would have 
jurisdiction when claimants were all co-citizens as long as stakeholder was diverse and amount in 
controversy exceeded $75,000); Sanchez v. Prudential Inv. Mgmt., No. 15-00982, 2016 WL 5416546, at *2 
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Only two recent cases have been found in which (1) parties have argued 
to the courts that claimants must be diverse in Rule 22 and § 1332 strict 
interpleader actions in order to be constitutionally or statutorily sound and 
(2) the court presented a form of reasoning beyond reiterating the oft-quoted 
language that all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants. 
In 2017, American National Life Insurance, a resident of Texas, filed a 
Rule 22 and § 1332 interpleader action against five claimants, all residents of 
Florida, to a $1,000,000 insurance policy.200 Having no interest in which 
claimant the money went to, American National deposited the life insurance 
proceeds into the court’s registry and the court discharged the insurance 
company from the lawsuit.201 The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction for three reasons. First, the court held that “it 
is well-established that the Court must assess the existence of diversity 
jurisdiction at the time an action is filed.”202 Because there was complete 
diversity between American National and the five claimants when the 
insurance company filed its complaint, the court held that complete diversity 
existed at the time the action was filed.203 Second, the court held that “even 
 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016) (“The Court also has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
because Prudential is citizen of the State of New Jersey . . . , the Third-Party Defendants are all citizens 
of Texas, and the amount in controversy exceeds $399,000.”); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Wagner, No. 15-
00505, 2016 WL 1494711, at *2 n.2 (D. Utah Apr. 14, 2016) (plaintiff-stakeholder of Pennsylvania and 
defendant-claimants from Utah); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wells, No. 15-08170, 2016 WL 687135, at 
*3 n.2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2016) (plaintiff-stakeholder of New Jersey and defendant-claimants all from 
Arizona); Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, No. 14-01412, 2015 WL 5093206, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 
2015) (stakeholder diverse from co-citizen claimants); Allstate Assignment Co. v. Cervera, No. 13-096, 
2014 WL 12496902, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2014) (citation omitted) (finding jurisdictional 
requirements satisfied because “citizenship of the claimants” does not have to be diverse as long as “the 
stakeholder is diverse from all the claimants”), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 11705061 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 23, 2015); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moody Station & Grocery, No. 11-3457, 2014 WL 
12616797, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2014) (“[The stakeholder-plaintiff] is a citizen of Minnesota, and 
[claimants-defendants] Moody Station and The Big Store are citizens of Missouri.”); Lincoln Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. v. Ruybal, No. 12-02413, 2014 WL 3560293, at *2 (D. Colo. July 18, 2014) (Indiana stakeholder 
and Colorado claimants); Woodcrest United Methodist Church v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 
10-194, 2010 WL 11530298, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2010) (two Texas claimants diverse from the 
stakeholder); Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, No. 10-052, 2010 WL 11619670, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 
2010) (citations omitted) (“Primerica relies on complete diversity to establish jurisdiction, alleging that 
it is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, and that [claimants] are 
all citizens of Texas . . . . Based on Primerica’s allegations, complete diversity exits [sic] and, therefore, 
the Court has diversity jurisdiction.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Porter, No. 09-02058, 2010 WL 
11571217, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010) (Connecticut stakeholder and claimants from California); Reliastar 
Life Ins. Co. v. Esparza, No. 09-332, 2009 WL 10669143, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2009) (all Texas 
claimants diverse from Minnesota stakeholder). 
200 Am. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hansen, No. 17-341-30, 2017 WL 2348856, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 
30, 2017). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at *2 (citing Freeport–McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)). 
203 Id. 
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if discharging American National did divest the Court of its diversity 
jurisdiction, the Court would still have supplemental jurisdiction over the 
claimants’ remaining claims.”204 Last, it held that if it accepted the claimants’ 
argument, it “would lead to results wholly inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the interpleader remedy.”205 Specifically, the court stated “[i]f 
courts dismissed an interpleader action after it discharged the stakeholder but 
before the adverse claimants had litigated their competing claims, the 
claimants would be left to assert their claims in separate actions, once again 
exposing the stakeholder to numerous lawsuits and multiple liability.”206 The 
second case, Americo Financial Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Bonner, only 
presented one argument for why diversity was not required between adverse 
claimants, which was that “diversity existed at the time the case was filed.”207 
These three main arguments for why diversity jurisdiction is satisfied are 
insufficient. They fail to consider that the interpleader action as filed with 
plaintiff-stakeholder versus nondiverse claimants itself contravenes the meaning 
of “controversy” under § 1332 and the Constitution.208 A “controversy” is 
determined not by the setup of the parties in the lawsuit, but by looking at the 
principal purpose of the suit and deciding which parties have a collision of 
interests.209 Thus, the case as filed in a Rule 22 interpleader action violates 
diversity jurisdiction requirements when the stakeholder has only the desire to 
admit liability to a claimant and be dismissed. This understanding remains valid 
even if interpleader is thought of as two stages, with the first stage being the 
mere opportunity for the stakeholder to recognize it is liable to someone, deposit 
the money, and leave, and the second stage being the chance for opposing parties 
to battle out their claims to the stake, showing that the legal issues that exist are 
truly between them. Under this two-stage model, in a bill of strict interpleader 
where the stakeholder readily admits liability without need for further litigation 
as to whether it is indeed liable, the first stage is merely incidental.210 Moreover, 
the claim that the policies of interpleader will be undermined if diversity is 
required between claimants is also faulty. This argument fails to take judicial 
notice of the fact that federal courts are not the only judicial bodies capable of 
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providing justice and fairness. All states have methods available for interpleader 
actions211—methods that should be fairly easy to take advantage of when 
disinterested stakeholders sue co-citizen claimants in the co-citizens’ state. 
In contrast to the arguments presented for why diverse claimants are not 
constitutionally or statutorily required, there have been at least three recent 
federal district court cases that simply assume that there must be diversity 
between adverse claimants under Rule 22. These cases proceed without citing 
the boilerplate language that congressional diversity requirements are satisfied 
so long as all plaintiffs are diverse from all defendants. Judge McNulty of the 
District of New Jersey noted briefly in a footnote that because the interpleader 
action at issue in a recent case was brought under rule interpleader, and not 
statutory interpleader, jurisdiction had to be established either based on 
federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.212 
Without explanation, Judge McNulty assumed that because all the claimants 
were from New Jersey, jurisdiction clearly could not be established under 
§ 1332 when “even minimal diversity is absent.”213 However, a different judge 
in the same district assumed that § 1332 requirements were met so long as the 
stakeholder was diverse form the claimants, even if the claimants were co-
citizens.214 This judge did not reference Judge McNulty’s decision coming out 
of the same district a month earlier. More recently, the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin simply claimed that “[f]or both the statute and the rule, the plaintiff 
must show diversity exists between at least two claimants to the fund” without 
citing any authority for the proposition.215 Similarly the Southern District of 
Alabama assumed that when establishing jurisdiction over an action in which 
the claimants were diverse from each other, diverse claimants were needed to 
satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332.216 
What is most puzzling is that some federal appellate courts at least started 
out recognizing that the true controversy in an interpleader action for 
purposes of jurisdiction was that between the claimants, not the claimants and 
the stakeholder. The Eighth Circuit went from asserting that the citizenship 
of the disinterested stakeholder was only nominal and “does not affect the 
question of federal jurisdiction,”217 in 1937 to holding in 2016, without any cited 
authority, that under Rule 22 jurisdiction was established so long as the 
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claimants were diverse from the stakeholder.218 Similarly in 1957, the Fifth 
Circuit, when deciding whether complete diversity was required between 
adverse claimants, cited to Treinies and recognized its holding that the 
Constitution requires no diversity between a stakeholder and claimant due to 
the fact that the controversy does not exist between them in strict interpleader 
actions.219 Yet without explanation or reference back to its previous decision, 
the Fifth Circuit in 1980 stated that interpleader actions brought under Rule 
22 required complete diversity between the stakeholder and defendant-
claimants.220 Other circuit courts eventually just held that diversity 
requirements were satisfied by a plaintiff-stakeholder diverse from defendant 
claimants without any reference to Treinies or Tashire and often with little legal 
reasoning. In 1952, the Third Circuit, without citing Treinies, simply stated that 
in strict interpleader actions “the diversity need only be between the plaintiff 
stakeholder and the individual claimants. Diversity among these individual 
claimants is not required.”221 And in 1953, 1960, 1982, 1987, 1988, and 1993, the 
Second, Tenth, Ninth, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits respectively held 
the same without acknowledging Treinies or Tashire.222 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The lower federal courts have consistently heard, and continue to hear, 
strict interpleader actions between a stakeholder and nondiverse claimants 
under Rule 22 and § 1332. If the Supreme Court’s traditional understanding of 
“controversy” between citizens of different states is taken seriously and its 
precedent is given a closer look, then the federal courts have consistently heard, 
and continue to hear, cases that go beyond what is permitted by Congress’s 
general diversity jurisdiction statute and Article III of the Constitution. Yet 
one must wonder if it would wreak havoc and seem unduly unfair if federal 
courts switched course and began denying to hear such cases on the basis of a 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. To that, there are several responses. 
First, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “interpleader was never 
intended . . . to be an all-purpose ‘bill of peace.’”223 As stated in Tashire, 
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“[n]one of the legislative and academic sponsors of a modern federal 
interpleader device viewed their accomplishment as a ‘bill of peace,’ capable 
of sweeping dozens of lawsuits out of the various state and federal courts in 
which they were brought into a single interpleader proceeding.”224 While it 
should always be preferred that our systems of procedure are also systems of 
justice, they must operate within the bounds that the Constitution has 
provided and cannot always be used to solve every vexation. Luckily, justice 
does not have to be sacrificed in the case of strict interpleader actions with 
co-citizen claimants: the state court doors are open. 
Every single state within the United States has a state rule of procedure 
permitting interpleader actions, and each rule establishes requirements 
similar to federal interpleader.225 For example, the Georgia statute for 
interpleader provides that in cases when “a person is possessed of property or 
funds or owes a debt or duty, to which more than one person lays claim of 
such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, 
he may apply to equity to compel the claimants to interplead.”226 The Hawaii 
interpleader rule uses virtually the same language as the federal rule, 
providing that “[p]ersons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as 
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the 
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability,” and that “[i]t is 
not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of the several claimants 
or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common origin or 
are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another . . . .”227 
The largest differences between state and federal interpleader are only slight 
variations in the language that is used. For example, the Illinois statute providing 
for interpleader states that “[p]ersons having claims against the plaintiffs arising 
out of the same or related subject matter may be joined as defendants and required 
to interplead when their claims may expose plaintiff to double or multiple 
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liability.”228 And Louisiana, while mirroring the same interpleader requirements 
of the federal rule, calls the interpleader suit a “concursus proceeding.”229 It 
would seem that co-citizen claimants should have little issue with having their 
claims adjudicated in state court, especially because state courts are better suited 
to answer questions about state law in complicated legal situations in which it is 
unclear to whom certain money or property belongs. It would also seem difficult 
to imagine a situation in which an insurance company or other stakeholder 
admitting to liability would care whether they were in a state court or a federal 
court. Further, questions such as venue and personal jurisdiction should rarely 
prevent these cases from being brought into state court because the claimants 
are all from the same state. Justice and peace still exist for the potentially vexed 
stakeholder—they simply exist in state courts, not federal ones. 
It is important to clarify that this Comment stands for one limited 
proposition: that the controversy requirement, under both Congress’s statutes 
granting jurisdiction and the Constitution, means that the jurisdiction of 
federal courts in strict interpleader actions only extends to suits in which at 
least one claimant is diverse from another adverse claimant. This does not 
mean that Rule 22 or § 1332 on their own are unconstitutional—but merely 
that the jurisdiction requirements under Rule 22 interpleader actions have 
been interpreted and applied incorrectly. 
The question remains, however,—if federal district courts begin to agree 
with this Comment’s proposition—can they start dismissing cases between 
nondiverse citizens for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction despite that their 
federal appellate circuit courts have ruled that federal district courts do have 
jurisdiction over such cases? If one takes the Treinies and Tashire precedent to 
seriously stand as Supreme Court holdings that diverse claimants are needed in 
interpleader actions, then it would seem that lower federal district courts may 
be able to dismiss the cases for lack of jurisdiction regardless of what their circuit 
courts have said on the issue. While the scholarship is filled to the top with 
commentary on how precedent should and does work in the federal district 
courts,230 it appears that the question of whether district courts should be bound 
by appellate opinions that are contrary to Supreme Court opinions has gone 
unanswered and unexamined. It is well established that lower courts must 
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“follow a precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it,”231 but if Treinies and 
Tashire stand for the need of diverse claimants for diversity jurisdiction to be 
established, then the two superior courts to the district court (the Supreme 
Court and the federal appellate court) are at odds with each other.232 Although 
the Supreme Court has not addressed this exact scenario, it has stated that 
“unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent 
of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”233 
CONCLUSION 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated and went 
into effect in 1938, Rule 22 began walking federal courts outside the diversity 
jurisdiction door. On the one hand, it seemed clear to the Supreme Court 
that the requirement under Congress’s interpleader act that there be diversity 
between adverse claimants sounded in statutory and constitutional 
requirements. On the other hand, appellate and lower federal district courts 
have been hearing cases between nondiverse claimants in strict interpleader 
actions for years. To ensure actions under Rule 22 do not continue to 
contravene the Constitution, its jurisdictional requirements—as understood 
to be conferred by § 1332—must be reeled in. Such reeling will not lead all 
insurance companies and similar stakeholders astray, but will instead lead 
them to state courts, where interpleader is alive and well. The result will be 
that state courts get to hear state-law disputes between claimants of that state, 
allowing state courts to be the master of their own law. This result aligns with 
the historical underpinnings of Article III that federal courts should not 
intrude in the business of state courts where no such intrusion is needed. 
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